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INTRODUCTION 
Politics can be deeply personal, and its practice need not, of 
course, be electoral.  The practice of identity politics in the workplace 
is not novel, manifesting itself both in individual antidiscrimination 
claims and even in the collective bargaining context.1  In the public 
sector, the practice of identity politics often merges with politics in its 
purest sense, as workers’ speech receives First Amendment protection 
from employer sanction only if it is “commenting upon matters of 
public concern”2 and not merely a personal grievance.3  The 
constraints of First Amendment protection invite the practice of 
identity politics by proxy, in which the patina of a larger societal issue 
is the vehicle by which differences among workers are expressed.4 
Identity politics in the workplace coexists uneasily with a legal 
regime of non-discrimination, for its practice may render a worker of 
                                                          
 1. See Molly McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Union:  Identity Politics in the 
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1350–51 (1997) (discussing the tension between an 
individual rights model of workplace equality and unionism and noting that “federal 
law effectively encouraged employees to define their grievances at the workplace, 
and to organize themselves, through reference to personal or group identity rather 
than through a union”). 
 2. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
 3. Id. at 146–48. 
 4. Scholars have focused on race discrimination by proxy, in which employers 
utilize characteristics highly correlated with race as a basis for adverse job actions 
against applicants.  See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other 
Name?:  On Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and 
Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1288–89 (2005) (exploring the effect of being 
perceived as a member of a certain racial group on a person’s hiring or promotion 
prospects).  This use of the proxy concept is distinct from my construct:  this Article 
is concerned with identity-based speech rather than status discrimination and with 
constitutional protections against retaliation for such speech rather than 
discrimination. 
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color more susceptible to discrimination.5  If we accept the legal and 
cognitive psychology literature that demonstrates that prejudice 
against racial minorities emanates from latent attitudes learned and 
reinforced over time,6 consider the relative potency of these cues for 
latent prejudice:  a White supervisor who works with a Black, versus a 
White supervisor who works with a Black whom she overhears 
implying that President Ronald Reagan was a racist.7  The Black 
employee in the latter example draws attention to her race, to her 
social inequality, in a manner that potentiates a more instant and 
perhaps visceral cuing of latent prejudices.  To place matters in a  
contemporary context, consider the recent verbal gaffe by Senator 
Joseph Biden in describing Democratic presidential primary 
opponent Barack Obama, who is Black.  Biden said of Obama:  he is 
“the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright 
and clean and a nice-looking guy.”8  Setting to one side the 
stereotypical antithesis of Blacks as inarticulate, not bright, dirty, and 
ugly that Biden’s description inadvertently underscores, the 
statement also suggests the parameters of acceptable Black candidates 
for White Americans.  Shirley Chisholm, Jesse Jackson, and Al 
Sharpton were not mainstream candidates because each of their 
candidacies was strongly identified with their racial group, Blacks.  As 
with candidates, when workers of color speak from a vantage point 
that is strongly identified with their racial background, their speech 
places them outside the mainstream of the White employment 
environment. 
Public employees enjoy free speech rights not enjoyed by private 
sector workers.9  This disparity creates greater potential for “voice” to 
                                                          
 5. See Fadi Hanna, Gay Self-Identification and the Right to Political Legibility, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 75, 76 (2006) (“[S]elf-identifying speech, because it makes us susceptible 
to discrimination, is often the first casualty of that discrimination.”). 
 6. See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (surveying academic literature 
on unconscious racial stereotyping and bias). 
 7. See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (using cognitive psychology to 
analyze a White employer’s reaction to a Black employee who made comments 
suggesting that Reagan was a racist). 
 8. Dan Balz, Biden Stumbles at the Starting Gate, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A6. 
 9. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 739 (Idaho 2003) 
(“[A]n employee does not have a cause of action against a private sector employer 
who terminates the employee because of the exercise of the employee’s 
constitutional right of free speech.”).  But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 
894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Although Novosel is not a government employee, the 
public employee cases do not confine themselves to the narrow question of state 
action.  Rather, these cases suggest that an important public policy is in fact 
implicated wherever the power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate the terms of 
employee political activities [i.e., speech].”).  Most courts have rejected Novosel’s 
extension of free speech rights to private sector employees.  See Grinzi v. San Diego 
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become both a vehicle by which identity politics is practiced as well as 
an instigator of the process by which employees are racialized.  To 
racialize or “race” a person or his speech is to bring to bear the 
dominant social position of the listener and the unequal social 
position of the speaker in assessing the legitimacy of the speech.10  
Racialization is a process, a type of racial profiling that permutates 
itself in relation to the racial category of its object and the cultural 
understandings attendant to that category.11  Critically, however, 
racialization can occur not only when workers of color consciously 
employ speech on matters of public concern in the practice of 
identity politics, but rather whenever these workers address a topic 
and express a viewpoint that is associated with their social 
subordination.  Whether intended as an act of identity politics or not, 
such expressions collide with the dominant social norms of the White 
workplace.  These norms, which are both implicit and explicit in 
character, are imported from external society into the workplace and 
reflect majoritarian hegemony.12  The stigmatization engendered by 
such speech reflects an economy of racialization, in which some 
norm-violational conduct is more acceptable than others, depending 
on the degree to which the conduct at issue is raced.  I do not invoke 
the term economy to mean bartering of any sort but rather to 
describe a structure by which the liabilities of racialization are meted 
                                                          
Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing numerous cases 
in which the court has refused to adopt, or expressed disapproval of, Novosel). 
 10. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the 
United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 904 n.4 (2003) (discussing the process by which 
individuals are “raced” by Whites in order to resist equality-enhancing benefits, such 
as affirmative action); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:  Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 443 n.52 (1990) (citing Comments of 
Kendall Thomas at the Panel on Critical Race Theory, Conference on Frontiers of 
Legal Thought, Duke Law School, Jan. 26, 1990) (noting with approval Professor 
Thomas’s assertion that individuals are “raced” through millions of ongoing 
contemporaneous speech/acts). 
 11. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization:  Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen 
Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2000) (asserting that the racialization process, 
in the context of its application to Chinese Americans, is based upon a stereotype 
that the Chinese are unable and unwilling to assimilate into American society). 
 12. See Gerald R. Ferris et al., Reactions of Diverse Groups to Politics in the Workplace, 
22 J. MGMT. 23, 27 (1996) (“The dominant group in an organization at any given 
time tends to establish the general tone for all other groups.  Because Caucasian 
males typically represent the majority, and indeed, the dominant coalition in most 
organizations, they tend to be the ones selected as ‘insiders’; that is, the ones taught 
to hone their political skills and perfect their craft.”); Alex Geisinger, Are Norms 
Efficient?  Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (“Norms arise only because rational individuals attain 
benefits from interacting with others and thus value the acceptance of others.  
Individuals attempt to determine the majority preference, and the failure to act in 
accordance with the view of the majority negatively impacts one’s perceived 
attractiveness to other group members.”). 
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out.13  For instance, as suggested heretofore, race is often more 
threatening to Whites when it talks back to them than when it merely 
exists among them.14  Within the economy, or along the continuum, 
of racialization, then, such conduct may more readily engender in a 
listener’s mind an association between the employee of color and his 
social inequality.15  The vitality of First Amendment protection 
afforded the expression of speech by those most likely to be 
victimized by the economy of racialization is the focus of this Article.  
The implications of the First Amendment’s protection of norm-
violational speech by people of color for the norm-violational 
conduct of broad classes of socially unequal employees are a 
concomitant concern.  Finally, this Article probes the reciprocal 
implications of speech constraints in the public and private sectors. 
In Part I, after setting forth an autobiographical narrative that 
maps many of the social inequities of minority racializable speech, I 
traverse the continuum of racialization by examining a recent 
Supreme Court case in which a Latino assistant district attorney’s 
speech had no apparent racial overtones, Garcetti v. Ceballos.16  Garcetti 
arguably represents the low ebb of racialization while illustrating how 
race-imbued social predispositions can nevertheless influence an 
employer’s reaction to employee speech.  Rankin v. McPherson,17 an 
earlier Supreme Court case, locates a different point in the economy 
of racialization, one where the racial cast of the speech is 
unmistakable but where we lack sufficient information to know 
whether the speaker intended to hold herself out as an active 
practitioner of identity politics.  Occupying an uncertain space in 
between Rankin and the archetype of racialization is the controversy 
surrounding University of Colorado Professor Ward Churchill.  
                                                          
 13. An economy in this respect means “[a]n orderly, functional arrangement of 
parts; an organized system.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 583 (3d ed. 1996). 
 14. Cf. Davis v. Boykin Mgmt. Co., No. 91-CV-359E(M), 1994 WL 714517, at *4 
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1994) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the terminated 
plaintiff in a Title VII action must show that he was replaced by a member of a non-
protected class, for “an employer might tolerate outspokenness in his white 
employees but find objectionable a comparable lack of reserve by a black employee 
because of a feeling that blacks ‘should know their place’”); Coleman v. Clark Oil & 
Ref. Co., 568 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (citing a Black plaintiff’s 
allegation that job promotions were given to Blacks “less outspoken regarding 
matters of apparent racial discrimination”). 
 15. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National 
Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1997) (defining the “political economy of 
race” as “the processes through which race is used to distribute power and maintain 
racial privilege”); Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies:  An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1215, 1230 (2002) (referencing the role of the political economy of race in 
endowing different skin colors with different social significance). 
 16. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 17. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
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Churchill, a Native American professor, used the term “little 
Eichmanns” in characterizing as enablers of American genocide the 
workers who perished in the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center 
attacks.18  The ensuing controversy raised confusing questions about 
the authenticity of Churchill’s Native American heritage as well as 
questions about Churchill’s interpretation of indigenous people’s 
history,19 the resolution of which could have broad implications for 
outsider scholarship and academic freedom generally.  That the 
controversy trained on Churchill’s heritage and his scholarship on 
Native Americans—matters having no apparent relationship to his 
controversial statements regarding 9/11—simultaneously illustrates 
how the economy of racialization can de-value speech based on the 
perceived absence of the racial bona fides of the speaker and how the 
very same bona fides can be deployed to subordinate a person of 
color when he behaves inconsistently with White norms.  Finally, Part 
I discusses Jeffries v. Harleston,20 a federal circuit case in which a Black 
professor consciously exercises racial and arguably racist voice.  The 
institutional and public outcry against Jeffries,21 whether justified or 
not, crystallized his status as a social subordinate and demonstrated a 
regimen for processing the errant speech of unequals that fortifies 
their inequality. 
Having shown how status inequality interfaces with speech on 
matters of public concern to the disadvantage of employees of color 
in Part I, Part II of this Article explores the doctrinal challenges that 
First Amendment jurisprudence faces in attempting to account for 
the social inequality of a speaker in the employment context.  I 
discuss the courts’ tendencies and limited stated justifications for 
applying only intermediate scrutiny to the prototype public employee 
free speech claim.  I then discuss the doctrinal machinations in which 
plaintiffs engage in order to obtain closer scrutiny of their claim.  
Finally, in order to demonstrate the full frailty of First Amendment 
protection for some of the most socially vulnerable speakers, I 
unpack in greater detail the inequality-reinforcing characteristics of 
the Court’s holding in Garcetti v. Ceballos.22  Part III concedes that the 
                                                          
 18. Ward Churchill, “Some People Push Back”:  On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, 
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/churchill.html. 
 19. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that the authenticity of 
Churchill’s claim of Native American heritage has been challenged). 
 20. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), modified by 52 F.3d 9 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
 21. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (relating how Jeffries’s employer 
classified his speech as racist and anti-Semitic). 
 22. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
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Supreme Court is unlikely to dash the Pickering23/Connick24 balancing 
test, under which courts effectively apply intermediate scrutiny to 
employee free speech claims.  I propose, however, a tactical means of 
shedding greater light on the manner in which speakers’ social 
subordination distorts the proper application of the First 
Amendment in determining the protection speech is due.  To do 
this, I juxtapose Garcetti with another retaliation case from the 2005–
2006 term, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White.25  I 
demonstrate that although it involves statutory speech rights under 
Title VII, Burlington Northern represents a competing vision about the 
social meanings and effects of workplace discourse and offers 
principles logically transferable to the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  I then re-litigate Garcetti under the aegis 
of Burlington Northern. 
I. STORIES ABOUT RACE, “SPEECH ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC 
CONCERN,” AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY 
A. Talking While Black:  A Narrative and a Topology 
I sat in a faculty meeting some years ago during which a White 
colleague urged the adoption of a faculty resolution condemning the 
anonymous drawing of swastikas on library desks.26  The matter had 
previously come to the attention of various faculty members as well as 
the law school administration.  The resolution was uncontroversial 
                                                          
 23. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 24. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 25. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
 26. My use of personal narrative, a first for me, reflects a longstanding belief in 
praxis:  race is a lived phenomenon, and those who write about it, regardless of their 
color, ought not to be “imperial scholars,” out of touch with the very realities and 
people whose plights are their subject matters.  See Richard Delgado, The Imperial 
Scholar:  Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 568 
(1984) (criticizing White scholars for attempting to monopolize the area of civil 
rights scholarship).  Delgado claimed that a number of these scholars were not 
attuned to the lives, perspectives, and aspirations of the very people about whom they 
were writing.  See id. (noting, for example, one author’s claims that Blacks no longer 
needed heightened judicial protection because they had ceased being an insular 
minority).  This concern seems no less pertinent to scholars of color who write in the 
area of race generally and about critical race theory in particular. 
Imagine a proponent of tort reform who became a multi-millionaire by winning a 
personal injury suit.  Imagine an ardent opponent of a woman’s right to choose who 
had an elective abortion.  Imagine the opponent of affirmative action who advances 
under its auspices.  From these examples, it should be clear that some ideological 
positions are difficult to de-personalize and, as such, fairly expose their proponents 
to a challenge of personal consistency.  In the context of race scholarship and critical 
race theory, those who espouse progressive and critical race theory but do not live it 
within their own professional or personal environs seem very much susceptible to 
Delgado’s charge. 
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and passed without debate, with obligatory thanks to its sponsor.  
While appropriately prideful of its vote, the faculty’s actions were de 
rigueur:  symbolic racism, or racial insult, is a relatively facile object of 
opprobrium for all but the racially hidebound.27  Popular racial 
discourse trains on such symbols (e.g., nooses,28 crosses, swastikas) 
and words that demean (e.g., “nappy-headed ho’s”29).  My colleagues’ 
concerns and actions were thus microcosmic. 
                                                          
 27. At least two types of symbolic racism require distinction here.  One is the type 
that enables institutional discrimination by covertly and pretextually marginalizing 
people of color.  This type of symbolic racism recasts racial motives as “‘moral 
feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism, self 
reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline.’”  Kevin Durrheim & John Dixon, 
Attitudes in the Fiber of Everyday Life:  The Discourse of Racial Evaluation and the Lived 
Experience of Desegregation, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 626, 628 (2004) (quoting Donald R. 
Kinder & David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics:  Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to 
the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414, 416 (1981)).  This brand of 
“symbolic racism is the glue that links political conservatism to racial prejudice 
among Whites in the contemporary era.”  David O. Sears & P.J. Henry, The Origins of 
Symbolic Racism, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 259, 264 (2003). 
Swastikas, confederate flags, burning crosses, and the like may well aid and abet 
institutional discrimination, but there is nothing covert about these symbols.  They 
are the manifestations of old-style racism driven underground by a modern “self-
presentational” norm that overt discrimination not be displayed.  See Durrheim & 
Dixon, supra, at 631 (asserting that individuals’ concerns about being perceived as 
racist have led to “[r]acial stereotypes [that] are implied rather than explicitly 
stated”).  Thus, I use the term “symbolic racism” to refer to transparent artifacts of 
racism, like a swastika or calling a person of color “nigger.”  To be sure, these 
symbols are often used to connote racial violence.  See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, 
Colored Speech:  Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 
631 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s reliance on the distinctive nature of cross 
burning as a harbinger of racial violence in denying that activity First Amendment 
protection).  But racial symbolism in popular discourse is now just as often deployed 
by Whites to imply an equivalency between tangible harms, such as being deprived of 
political representation, and ethereal offenses, such as being harmed by the visual 
appearance of a district.  See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 638, 642 (1993) (holding 
that White plaintiffs who suffered no impairment to either the proportionality of 
congressional representation from their state or to their right to freely cast a vote 
were permitted to bring a constitutional claim because a newly drawn congressional 
district “though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything 
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of 
race . . . .”).  I thus also use the term symbolic discrimination in contradistinction to 
what are often more consequential forms of racism, such as being denied a job on 
the basis of race or suffering present effects from the legacy of state-sanctioned 
discrimination. 
 28. Following the “Jena 6” controversy, in which violence erupted at a local high 
school in Louisiana after a noose was hung on a “Whites only” tree, a spate of noose-
hanging incidents occurred throughout the country, causing an emotional debate 
about the meaning of the symbol.  See, e.g., Paul Vitello, Few Answers About Nooses But 
Much Talk of Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, at A31 (reporting on incidents in 
the New York metropolitan area); Paul Vitello, This Halloween, the Man in the Noose 
Seems to Have Won a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at B1 (reporting that the 
noose symbol had become so sensitive an issue around the country that the 
Halloween ghoul in a noose had drawn protests). 
 29. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (asserting that the racist insult 
employed by Don Imus pales in comparison to the effects on minorities of the 
policies of politicians such as Ronald Reagan and Trent Lott). 
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Many of these same colleagues, however, could not see how it was 
plausible to charge the law school—and by extension, them—with 
discrimination for their rejection of each of eight Black entry-level 
candidates for a tenure-track position that the school had called back 
over a five-year period.  Indeed, one of the most resistant to this 
inference was the very colleague who sponsored the motion 
concerning the swastikas.  My colleagues’ denials seemed particularly 
strained in light of these candidates’ qualifications, which included 
doctorate degrees, federal appellate clerkships, law review 
memberships, and well-placed law review publications.  The source of 
the disparity in their reaction to the swastikas versus their failure to 
hire qualified Black entry-level candidates appeared to lie in their 
belief that there were neutral justifications for their hiring decisions 
that insulated them from the same ignominy associated with 
swastikas.  My colleagues did not appreciate that racial discrimination 
is most likely to take place when there is a neutral justification rather 
than when the actor’s behavior clearly abridges a social norm, as did 
the drawing of the swastikas.30 
Institutional racism, whose manifestations are often more 
inferential than direct, does not lend itself to the convenient moral 
indignation of railing against a symbol; rather it requires a higher 
order of thought and an understanding of the structural 
impediments to equal opportunity and their interaction with 
individual Whites’ motives, actions, and privileges.31  Those who press 
                                                          
 30. See Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination:  Differential 
Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 469 
(2002) (“Whites’ bias against Blacks is most likely to be expressed when socially 
appropriate, normative responses are less clearly defined and negative responses can 
be justified on factors others [sic] than race.”); see also Melissa Hart, Subjective 
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 747 (2005) 
(arguing that as a consequence of the conflict between denial of personal prejudice 
and latent prejudice feelings and beliefs, “discrimination is most likely to occur in 
contexts where it can be justified as something other than discrimination”). 
 31. See John A. Powell, The Race and Class Nexus:  An Intersectional Perspective, 25 
LAW & INEQ. 355, 358 (2007) (comprehending racism as more than bad motives and 
actions on the part of individual actors:  “race, racial meanings, and racial practices 
are really about all people in the United States, cultural meaning, institutional 
arrangements, and their interactions.  These inter-institutional actions and structures 
cannot be understood by looking for a single cause.”); see also Ian F. Haney Lopez, 
Institutional Racism:  Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 
1717, 1728 (2000) (setting forth a theory of discrimination that neither relies solely 
on the motivated actions of individuals nor ignores their relevance).  Lopez states: 
In this way, the term “institutional racism” functions here on both technical 
and popular levels.  In the technical sense, the phenomenon at issue is 
institutional racism because it involves unconsidered actions rooted in the 
sorts of institutions contemplated by New Institutionalism:  the background 
scripts and paths that mark social and organizational life.  In the popular 
sense, it is institutional racism because it describes activity more likely to 
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a charge of institutional discrimination, as I did on behalf of the 
Black law teaching candidates, are at a marked rhetorical and 
political disadvantage because the depth of the victimization wrought 
by institutional prejudice often cannot be abridged into a visual 
representation or an epithet.  Thus, rather than being hailed like my 
colleague who had proposed the resolution condemning the desk 
swastikas, my conduct came to be viewed as violating unspecified 
community norms.32 
If all condemnation of racism is not created equally because all 
racism is not equally recognized, a similar inequality applies to those 
who speak about race.  As an African American man who was the 
most vociferous, and sometimes the lone, voice concerning questions 
of minority hiring, I came to understand this acutely over the course 
of fifteen years at my institution.  Progressive White colleagues 
perceived their antiracist obligations to be limited to voting for the 
Black candidates rather than challenging the persons and structures 
that conspired to defeat—and in several instances mistreat—these 
candidates.33  Untenured colleagues of color were constrained by 
                                                          
arise within the formally organized bodies commonly referred to as 
institutions—for example, the courts. 
Id. at 1727–28.  Although I believe that a lack of sophistication in appreciating 
institutional racism played a large role in the faculty’s behavior, I would not dismiss 
White microaggression as a cohabiting explanation.  See Peggy C. Davis, Law as 
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989) (describing microaggression against 
Blacks as “subtle, stunning, often automatic and non-verbal exchanges which are ‘put 
downs’ of blacks by offenders” (quoting Chester M. Pierce et al., An Experiment in 
Racism:  TV Commercials, in TELEVISION & EDUCATION 62, 66 (C. Pierce ed., 1978))). 
 32. Whites recoil at being accused of discrimination or bigotry.  See infra note 96 
and accompanying text (discussing Whites’ discomfort at even the prospect of being 
perceived as racist).  The reaction of my colleagues thus emulated a well-traversed 
flight from substance: 
Minority (as well as non-minority) law professors and students who are 
committed to fostering diversity and inclusion in the legal profession are 
quite familiar with the ways in which resistance to exclusionary admissions, 
appointments, and promotion practices is silenced.  Oftentimes, this silence 
is organized around discourses of “collegiality,” which cast resistance as 
“uncollegial,” or through discourses of “academic freedom.”  These 
discursive practices enable impunity by silencing internal criticism and 
deflecting external accountability from the frequently racist and sexist 
decision-making processes through which social elites reproduce their 
political, institutional, and cultural dominance. 
Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Expanding Directions, Exploding Parameters:  
Culture and Nation in LatCrit Coalitional Imagination, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 203, 219 
(2000); see also Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space:  Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t 
Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1999) (“Naturally, the radical voices of oppositional 
thinkers who focus their concerns primarily on institutional racism are even less 
likely to be heard by White society or by their moderate ‘formal equality’ allies of 
color.”). 
 33. The reticence of progressive White colleagues, and their propensity to retreat 
no sooner than their reticence was overcome, was perhaps the most frustrating 
aspect of my advocacy for minority hiring.  Just as these colleagues occupy a 
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their status.  Other colleagues of color who enjoyed the protections 
of tenure appeared at least as invested in mollifying White colleagues 
as they were in resisting racism.  In this company, I was easily cast as a 
“race man.”  With this moniker came the common tropes and 
canards of racialization, including charges of “divisiveness,”34 
uncollegiality,35 and unwarranted anger.36 
Free speech is perhaps never free of social costs, but these costs are 
borne in different ways by speakers of different races.  Were my 
speech my only departure from community norms or expectations, 
perhaps this narrative would be unilluminating on the subject of 
workplace discourse.  But I spoke the language of an outsider while 
occupying the shoes of a social unequal.  I was Black in a White 
institution.  Perhaps more importantly, I was Black and male in a 
White institution.  I could not help but wonder, based on their at 
times irrational and apoplectic reactions to my charges of 
discrimination in hiring,37 whether some colleagues heard and 
                                                          
privileged space in general due to their race, they also occupy a privileged position 
with respect to debates about race:  “It is widely acknowledged among antiracists that 
Whites are taken more seriously when talking about racism than are people of color, 
just as feminists know that men are taken much more seriously than are women 
when they are talking about sexism.”  Eileen O’Brien, Whites Doing Antiracism:  
Discourse, Practice, Emotion and Organizations 104–05 (May 1999) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida), available at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/amg21 
53/obrian_e.pdf. 
 34. The charge by Whites that accusing them of discrimination is divisive is a 
rhetorical move whose logical extension would chill any claim of discrimination.  See 
Derrick Bell & Linda Singer, Commentary, Making a Record, 26 CONN. L. REV. 265, 
266 (1993) (“The debate [regarding a claim of racism] immediately centers upon 
the propriety of the accusation and the character of the accuser.  The complaint is 
displaced or discredited, even though we never reach its merits.”). 
 35. The use of collegiality standards to suppress racial dissent and marginalize 
those who charge discrimination typifies the process of racialization as that term is 
conceived in this Article.  The encroachment on a norm of racial hierarchy need not 
be great to earn the disrepute of being uncollegial.  Sumi Cho, “Unwise,” “Untimely,” 
and “Extreme”:  Redefining Collegial Culture in the Workplace and Revaluing the Role of 
Social Change, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 809–10 (2006).  When the speaker is a 
member of a minority group, as he often will be in the context of a charge of 
discrimination, his status is liable to be deployed to devalue his speech, for modern 
psychology teaches “that ‘subjective judgments of interpersonal skills and collegiality 
are quite vulnerable to stereotypic biases.’”  Hart, supra note 30, at 748 (quoting 
Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial:  Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1056 (1991)). 
 36. When Whites refer to a Black man as “angry,” the semantic choice is often a 
nod to stereotype.  See Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:  Race, Retaliation, and the 
Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 568 n.225 (2003) (citing BELL 
HOOKS, KILLING RAGE:  ENDING RACISM 18–19 (1995)) (contrasting the popular view of 
Black anger as gratuitously violent with the intellectual militancy represented by 
figures such as Malcolm X). 
 37. These reactions ranged from coercion (i.e., informing an untenured 
colleague of color that she should not have voted in support of a particular motion I 
made) to aggression (i.e., accosting me in a hallway with the expectation that I would 
retract my positions and then labeling me arrogant when I refused to do so) to 
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interpreted my speech through the prism of their privilege and my 
racial inequality.  I strongly suspect that they did—and continue to.  
The highly publicized experiences of the litigants of color discussed 
hereinafter reveal that my own experience is far from aberrational. 
Justice Harry Blackmun, in a moment of judicial candor, observed 
in a dissenting opinion on public employee privacy rights that “judges 
are never free from the feelings of the times or those emerging from 
their own personal lives.”38  Blackmun could just as easily have been 
referring to any other decision-maker or even to humans generally.  
He might have added that these personal influences need not be 
conscious.  As Professor Linda Krieger has observed in her highly 
regarded application of cognitive psychology to status-based 
discrimination, individuals seldom process information sui generis; 
rather, they simplify it into broader categories to expedite an 
understanding, albeit an imperfect one, of persons and events.39  
These cognitive processes can “result in stereotyping and other forms 
                                                          
provocation (i.e., publicly and confrontationally deriding my claim that race almost 
certainly played a role in the rejection of eight consecutive Black entry-level 
candidates) to suppression (attempting to sanction my speech).  Concededly, these 
are also reactions to unpopular speech made by non-minorities, but an equality of 
hostile treatment can be meted out with different motives and can inflict quite 
unequal injury.  The social position of an employee to whom such reactions are 
directed shades the cultural meaning of the exchange as well as the perceptions of 
the minority employee’s responses. 
 People of color like me and the Black candidates on whose behalf I spoke are far 
more likely to be victimized by institutional rather than symbolic discrimination.  See 
Lopez, supra note 31, at 1723 (contending that institutional racism “may well 
constitute the greatest source of ongoing harm to minority communities”); see also 
Harris, supra note 15, at 1216 n.4 (“[I]nstitutional practices are in fact the most 
dominant form of reproducing racial inequality in the modern age.” (citing Lopez, 
supra note 31, at 1730–48)).  Yet because the former is often treated as an 
unprovable abstraction, White colleagues could with impunity belittle my charges of 
discrimination against Black teaching candidates.  See Victor M. Goode & Conrad A. 
Johnson, Emotional Harm in Housing Discrimination Cases:  A New Look at a Lingering 
Problem, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1143, 1159 (2003) (noting that while evidence of 
symbolic racism such as racial epithets and threats of violence have resulted in 
rewards of damages for emotional harm in the context of housing discrimination 
lawsuits, emotional harms caused by the more subtle practice of institutional racism 
have been harder to prove).  Moreover, my or any other minority employee’s 
response to retaliatory actions of the sort enumerated here will be disadvantaged 
because such actions are often consciously or unconsciously perpetrated with a view 
towards eliciting a response that conforms to the stereotype the aggressor harbors of 
the minority employee’s racial group.  See Smith, supra note 36, at 568 n.225 
(contending that any confrontational opposition to discrimination by an African 
American employee is prone to being discounted as mere violent behavior because 
of the stereotypical portrayal of African Americans as angry). 
 38. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 734 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 39. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1188–91 (1995) (explaining that to approach every new encounter or individual as a 
unique experience would overwhelm the cognitive abilities of humans). 
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of biased intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational 
processes.”40  Once in place, stereotypes operate as a latent schema 
for perceiving other people and information about other people.41  
No intent is necessary to summon the stereotypes into operation.42  
Indeed, a decision-maker is often unaware that he harbors them.43 
The processing of language is not significantly different from the 
cognitive processing of people and information about people, for as 
sociolinguists observe, “people may be just as ‘biased’ in the 
interpretation of conversation or media messages.”44  Discourse plays 
an integral role in the reproduction of societal prejudice and 
discrimination.  The process is symbiotic.  On the one hand, the 
manner in which Whites discuss minorities, both in everyday 
conversation and in the media and other elite conduits, reinforces in-
group racial hegemony and out-group racial stereotypes.45  On the 
other hand, the same social cognition that affects Whites’ discourse 
about minorities also affects their perception and interpretation of 
minority speech.46  I have little doubt that much of the opposition to 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 1187. 
 41. See id. at 1190 (relating that schemas “influence[] the interpretation, 
encoding, and organizing of incoming information and mediate[] the drawing of 
inferences or the making of predictions about the schematized object or event”). 
 42. See id. at 1188 (noting that because stereotypes are created outside of the 
awareness of individuals, the individual employs them unintentionally). 
 43. See id. (explaining that people are unable to fully comprehend their own 
cognitive processes, and therefore stereotypes are a product of the individual’s 
unconscious mind). 
 44. TEUN A. VAN DIJK, COMMUNICATING RACISM:  ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN THOUGHT 
AND TALK 249 (1987). 
 45. See id. at 31 (“[S]ocial cognitions, in general, and ethnic attitudes, in 
particular, are acquired, shared, validated, normalized and communicated primarily 
through talk (and the media) rather than through perception and interaction.”); id. 
at 359–67 (discussing how prejudicial attitudes formulated by elite groups are 
promulgated through the media). 
 46. See id. at 23 (“[P]eople seldom act as passive reproducers of personal or social 
information derived from previous communicative events. . . . [R]ecipients apply a 
number of discourse comprehension strategies resulting in mental representations 
that may be rather distant transformations of the original source messages.”); id. at 
25 (“[T]he strategies of talk and persuasion must correspond to cognitive strategies 
for the manipulation of ethnic information in memory.”); id. at 37 (“No serious 
account of discourse meaning, coherence, or other semantic properties is possible 
without notions such as concepts, knowledge and beliefs, frames, scripts, or models, 
that is, in terms of mental representations and cognitive processes of various kinds.”); 
id. at 203 (“Each time in-group members are confronted with (information about) 
new, salient out-groups, they need not figure out again what properties of such a 
group are relevant and about which characteristics opinions should be formed. . . . 
With a minimum of information, group members are thus able to form relevant and 
effective belief and opinion systems about the out-group.  Obviously, this process is a 
function of several social structures and processes, such as communication, 
interaction, goals, and real or imagined social relationships with the out-group.”). 
Dr. Fern L. Johnson’s theory of Language-Centered Perspective on Culture 
captures the dynamics of interracial discourse as a cross-cultural exchange among 
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my speech was born of the often unconscious processes described 
above, though I do not discount the role of motivation. 
I opposed what I perceived to be discrimination against Black 
teaching candidates as a form of personal resistance to racism.  
People of color risk psychological and physical harm in internalizing 
discrimination.47  Those who use self-help to confront it are often 
compelled to do so as a result of the injury wrought by discrimination 
and as a self-defense mechanism against further harm.48  To be sure, 
not all employees who broach subjects about race or other 
controversial topics do so as an advocate.  Yet their speech is still 
subject to the arbitrary workings of interpretive bias (both cognitive-
process-based and motivational) and social and situational inequality.  
The stories below parallel my own in important respects.  First, the 
workers’ speech engages racism beyond its symbolic incarnation; the 
speakers thus labor under a political and rhetorical handicap that 
affects the perceived legitimacy of their speech.  Second, whether 
intentional or not, the speech is referential to the workers’ own social 
inequality, making it more likely that the very status to which their 
speech adverts becomes a determinant in assessing the speech’s 
legitimacy.  Finally, the workers’ social inequality is deployed by 
White listeners to de-legitimate their speech. 
These cases and current controversies, like my own, confirm that 
outsider speech by persons of color is high-risk, norm-violational 
conduct that subjects them to the economy of racialization in the 
workplace.  Reactions and sanctions may vary with the precise nature 
of the speech and other incidentals, but in each instance, the social 
inequality of the speaker—his race—plays a discernible role in the 
interpretation of and reaction to his speech.  I set forth the narratives 
below to round out the critical foreground for interrogating whether 
the First Amendment is capable of neutralizing the social inequality 
                                                          
American citizens.  See FERN L. JOHNSON, SPEAKING CULTURALLY:  LANGUAGE DIVERSITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (2000) (“Because communication arises within the cultural 
frameworks of participants, it is neither neutral nor objective but, rather, thickly 
cultured. . . . Intercultural communication occurs when the participants do not have 
full command of one another’s cultural patterns or discourses and must somehow 
communicate across the divide.”). 
 47. See Smith, supra note 36, at 548–49 (discussing studies on adverse health 
effects, such as high blood pressure and increased feelings of stress, that result from 
minorities suppressing anger over racism). 
 48. See id. at 548–50 (reviewing the results of studies that indicate that 
suppressing one’s hostility toward racism contributes to hypertensive blood pressure 
and that responding to unfair treatment reduces the deleterious effects of 
discrimination). 
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of the speaker in determining whether a public employee’s speech 
will be protected.49 
B. Richard Ceballos and the Invisible Hand of Race 
When he voiced concerns that a deputy sheriff may have falsified 
information on an affidavit for a search warrant, deputy district 
attorney Richard Ceballos, a Latino, was not on a crusade against 
police misconduct,50 although a then-recent police corruption 
scandal, the Rampart scandal, had left indelible imprints on the 
                                                          
 49. I have intentionally selected cases and controversies involving speakers of 
color whose speech is politically left-of-center for two reasons.  First, as a historical 
matter, Blacks who have been persecuted by the government for their speech have 
been primarily those whose speech matches the left-of-center political shade.  See, 
e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966) (overturning on First Amendment 
grounds the Georgia House of Representatives’ exclusion of Representative Julian 
Bond, who had been refused his seat because of his vocal criticism of American 
involvement in Vietnam); MARTIN BAUML DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON:  A BIOGRAPHY 
388 (1988) (chronicling the State Department’s revocation of singer-actor-activist 
Robeson’s passport following his speech denouncing President Truman’s 
deployment of troops to Korea and Black Americans’ service in the war); Jeffrey 
Rogers Hummel, Not Just Japanese Americans:  The Untold Story of U.S. Repression During 
‘The Good War’, 7 J. HIST. REV. 285, 303 (1986), available at http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v0 
7/v07p285_Hummel.html (documenting that of the more than 200 prosecutions 
during World War II under the Espionage Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 
the Smith Act, or the Selective Service Act, Blacks made up the largest number, with 
Black Muslims and other Blacks who sympathized with the Japanese as victims of 
White oppression composing most of this group).   
 Second, while I do not doubt that conservative minorities such as Justice Clarence 
Thomas are in some sense “raced” when they are criticized for their White-identified 
views, we should appreciate the disingenuousness of their claim.  Black conservatives 
flirt with an inherent logical fallacy in insisting their ideology should not be defined 
by racial metrics—that is, they should not be expected to reflect Black views.  Even as 
they insist that they should not be pigeonholed or stereotyped in this manner, some 
of the most influential of this lot, like Thomas, are guilty of stereotyping Blacks 
whose views are representative of the Black body politic.  See Terry Smith, Autonomy 
Versus Equality:  Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L. REV. 261, 286–87 (2005) 
(critiquing Justice Thomas’s view that a heavily Black congressional district drawn to 
elect a Democrat should be viewed as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander rather 
than a permissible partisan gerrymander:  “Justice Thomas is a jurist who has refused 
to be defined by his race to any extent but is willing to define Black voters solely in 
terms of their race.”).  Moreover, the Black conservative claim of being “raced” or 
stereotyped is often a complaint that their views are being critiqued by other Blacks 
for their racial harm in the same way these Blacks critique the views of White 
conservatives.  Their claim, in short, is a plea for racial exemption.  Contrary to these 
specious claims, when conservative minorities are “raced” in the sense that this 
Article uses that term, it is in the unusual case where there is same-race authority, 
see, for example, Scott Jaschik, $600K for Fired Professor, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26, 
2007, http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/26/cobbs (reporting on a Black 
Republican who had views that were in “a distinct minority” at a historically Black 
college and was fired from her tenured position at the school), or in cases where the 
conservative minority’s political calculations misfired with the White audience whose 
receptivity was initially presumed.  My jurisprudential analysis can be applied to 
either of these non-paradigmatic circumstances. 
 50. Telephone Interview with Richard Ceballos, District Attorney, Los Angeles 
County, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 28, 2006). 
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criminal justice system in Los Angeles.51  Nor did Ceballos author the 
memoranda questioning the veracity of the police affiant as an act of 
identity politics, though he describes one lieutenant seeking his 
removal from the case as a “classical redneck.”52  Finally, Ceballos did 
not believe his actions were perceived through racialized lenses by his 
supervisors, for indeed one of his immediate supervisors was, like he, 
a Latino. 
Notwithstanding Ceballos’s memos, his supervisors decided to 
proceed with prosecution of the case.53  At a suppression hearing, 
Ceballos testified about the inaccuracies he found in the affidavit.54  
The trial court denied the motion to suppress.55  In the aftermath of 
these events, Ceballos was transferred from his supervisory position of 
calendar attorney, assigned to another courthouse, and denied a 
promotion.56  Believing these and other actions to be retaliation for 
his memoranda questioning the veracity of the police affiant, 
Ceballos sued, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.57 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States Supreme Court answered 
Ceballos’s claim prophylactically.  Although public sector employees 
do not forfeit free speech rights by virtue of their government 
employment, “when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline.”58  Ceballos may 
have fallen victim to the Supreme Court’s misguided efforts to 
contrive a categorical distinction between public employee speech as 
citizen and public employee speech as servant, but, at first blush and 
by his own reckoning, he was not a victim of his employer’s 
racialization of him or his speech.  The economy of racialization, 
however, is one of shades and degrees rather than demarcations.  
Speech, even if not intended as identity speech, may be racialized in 
                                                          
 51. See generally Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1, 2000, at 32 
(detailing the Rampart scandal, in which corrupt Los Angeles police officers stole 
drug evidence to sell on the streets, planted weapons on innocent suspects, shot 
innocent victims, and falsely testified about their activities); id. at 62 (reporting that 
the Rampart scandal exposed a criminal justice system in which “[c]orrupt police 
officers have been protected by laws, ballot initiatives and court decisions that have 
tipped the scale against defendants”). 
 52. Telephone Interview with Richard Ceballos, supra note 50. 
 53. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1960. 
 2008] SPEAKING AGAINST NORMS 539 
proportion to its susceptibility to being perceived as identity speech,59 
and racialization, in turn, does not depend on the active intentions of 
those to whom the speech is directed.60 
Although he did not understand his supervisors’ retaliatory actions 
to be influenced by his race or theirs, Ceballos nonetheless described 
the mentality of his supervisors as “protect the police.”61  In his view, 
he was punished for “not going along with the program.”62  Indeed, 
Ceballos’s Latina supervisor, Najera, was arguably even more 
encamped in this mentality, given her familial connections to law 
enforcement:  both her husband and brother were policemen.63  
Stripped of any racial connotations, the conduct of Ceballos’s 
supervisors certainly fits what social psychologists refer to as “the 
minimal group paradigm”:  the mere existence of social groups 
creates biases by which members of the in-group pre-judge members 
of an out-group.64  The injection of race as an element of the social 
group exacerbates the potential for prejudice.65  Here, the groups 
divided along the lines of those more inclined to side with the police 
and those more inclined to question them.  Despite his shared 
ethnicity with one of his supervisors, Ceballos’s supervisors 
                                                          
 59. See KEITH REAVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?  WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES 
AND RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 78–90 (1997) (using a social experiment to 
demonstrate that those political issues with a greater racial content display greater 
ability to prime Whites to vote against Black candidates:  “The political effectiveness 
of ‘racial code’ is related to Whites’ perceptions about the importance of race in the 
campaign.”); Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Comment, Geduldig Reborn:  Hibbs as a 
Success(?) of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 541, 
570 (2005) (summarizing psychological research demonstrating that as the 
importance of a group characteristic increases, the observer will categorize based on 
that characteristic).  However, in formal deliberative settings outside of 
conversational and political discourse, namely jury deliberations, some studies have 
shown the salience of race as an issue at trial to increase the evenhandedness of 
jurors’ convictions and sentencing of defendants.  See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe 
C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries?  A Review of Social 
Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1016 (2003) (“[S]tudies provide 
support for the hypothesis that White juror bias is actually more likely to occur in 
trials without salient racial issues, where norms regarding race are weak—a 
conclusion that is consistent with theories of modern racism.”). 
 60. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (explaining that because the 
formation of stereotypes occurs unintentionally in an individual’s subconscious, the 
individual applies them in the context of racialization without knowing that he is 
doing so). 
 61. Telephone Interview with Richard Ceballos, supra note 50. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice, in 
CONFRONTING RACISM:  THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 33, 45 (J. Eberhardt & S. 
Fiske eds., 1998). 
 65. See id. at 45–46 (basing social groups on real-world factors such as race, rather 
than on random factors created for the purpose of studies, intensifies prejudice 
because of the existence of longstanding antagonism towards social out-groups and a 
desire to maintain the present social hierarchy). 
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represented a hegemonic social viewpoint while Ceballos’s speech 
was an outlier, particularly in the setting of a prosecutor’s office. 
The “protect the police” mentality of prosecutors ensues in large 
part from their dependence on the police to develop evidence and 
testify in order to bring successful criminal prosecutions.66  This 
practical reality is girded by cognitive bias, for “[i]n hypothesis testing 
terms, [prosecutors] are testing the hypothesis that the defendant is 
guilty.  The phenomenon of confirmation bias suggests a natural 
tendency to review the reports not for exculpatory evidence that 
might disconfirm the tested hypothesis, but instead for inculpatory, 
confirming evidence.”67  Thus, it is not difficult to understand how 
and why Ceballos’s speech abridged a work norm. 
Nor is it difficult to connect that workplace norm to a larger social 
pathos.  Setting to one side Najera’s familial associations with the 
police, which likely reinforced her views, the citizenry at large tends 
to have a favorable view of the police.68  Ceballos’s challenge to the 
veracity of the police officer’s search warrant affidavit affronted the 
mutualistic operation of societal perception and workplace norms, to 
say nothing of the personal feelings of his Latina supervisor. 
We have thus far artificially denuded the “protect the police” 
mentality of its racial vestiges, largely in deference to Ceballos’s belief 
that race played little obvious role in his discipline.  Race, however, 
plays an undeniable role in the public perception of the police, and 
Ceballos’s challenge to the honesty of a police officer did not take 
place in a cultural vacuum.  One survey found that while nearly half 
of Whites expressed the highest level of satisfaction with 
neighborhood police, only a quarter of Blacks did, and only about a 
third of Latinos did.69  Blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos, are more 
likely to perceive the police as corrupt, to believe that they use 
excessive force, to believe that the police stop people without good 
reason, and to report having been the recipient of insulting language 
                                                          
 66. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse:  The 
Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 305 (2001) (asserting that a 
prosecutor’s relationship with police officers can create conflicts with his ethical 
responsibility to ensure that justice is done). 
 67. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:  Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1603 (2006). 
 68. See Ben Brown & William Reed Benedict, Perceptions of the Police:  Past Findings, 
Methodological Issues, Conceptual Issues and Policy Implications, 25 POLICING:  INT’L J. 
POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 543, 546–47 (2002) (citing survey data indicating that 
the police represented one of the most favorably looked upon organizations in the 
United States). 
 69. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Determinants of Public Satisfaction with the 
Police, 8 POLICE Q. 279, 289 (2005). 
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from a police officer.70  In light of these findings, when Ceballos, a 
Latino, brought alleged police misconduct to the attention of one 
White superior, Sundstedt, and another superior whose husband and 
brother were police officers, his speech may not have had obvious 
racial content, but it carried with it racial connotations.  It is in this 
regard that Ceballos’s experience can be placed within the economy 
of racialization, even if at a low ebb. 
The precise placement of Ceballos’s experience within the 
economy of racialization varies depending on whether the 
perspective is ex-ante or ex-post.  Although Ceballos’s initial 
assessment of the retaliation against him was that it was largely 
colorblind and outside the sector of racialization, his actions 
following the incident suggest otherwise.  He co-founded the Latino 
Prosecutors Association, composed of Latino prosecutors.71  He is 
currently the president of the National Hispanic Prosecutors 
Association.72  And he became a member of several other minority 
organizations, including the Hispanic National Bar Association and 
the California La Raza Lawyers Association.73  He readily attributes his 
increased political activism to the retaliation.74  Rather than a 
contradiction, however, Ceballos’s assessment of his treatment versus 
his reaction to it is perhaps more accurately viewed in terms of pre-
conscience versus post-conscience racial identity formation.75 
Ironically, the very contestability of Ceballos’s experience as a 
racialization event marks an important point of convergence with my 
own speech narrative.  I contend that speech that expresses a 
viewpoint identified with the speaker’s social inequality exposes the 
speaker to discrimination that he might not have otherwise incurred 
and permits the racial attributes and/or attitudes of the discussants to 
                                                          
 70. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct, 51 
SOC. PROBS. 305, 314 (2004). 
 71. Email from Richard Ceballos, District Attorney, Los Angeles County, to Terry 
Smith (Feb. 2, 2007) (on file with author). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. (“I don’t think race had much if anything to do with what happened to 
me.  But because of what I experienced, I became more politically active.”). 
 75. See Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:  Discrimination by 
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1173–76 (2004) (discussing 
“progression” models of racial identity development but cautioning that these 
models may not adequately explain Latino racial identity formation).  My discussion 
of Ceballos’s circumstances presents no occasion for me to critique the adequacy of 
these progression models, since I do not purport to evaluate Ceballos’s life 
circumstances but rather only the change in how Ceballos came to approach his job.  
That change roughly maps the contours of progression models, in which the 
minority has a neutral or negative racial self-identity but transitions to “a strongly 
racially identified subject who is better socially adjusted and resilient in 
discriminatory circumstances.”  Id. at 1174. 
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affect the perceived legitimacy of the speech.  Ceballos’s avowed 
intentions were quite different from my own, and his speech lacked 
the obvious racial content that my statements to my colleagues about 
faculty hiring did.  Regardless of these differences, both types of 
conduct were met with attempts at retaliation and suppression.  Thus, 
even if we totally de-racialize Ceballos’s experience, it nevertheless 
illustrates the unique character of speech as an impetus for in-group 
discrimination against non-conforming viewpoints and marks a 
baseline for evaluating the reactions of authorities confronted with 
speech more unambiguously identified with the social inequality of 
the speaker.  If Ceballos was targeted for retaliation for arguably non-
racial speech made pursuant to his job, we should relax any 
incredulity about the likelihood of negative reactions to racialized 
speech.  We will see as we progress through the continuum of 
racialization that:  (1) non-conforming speech, regardless of its racial 
content, provokes a similar reaction against speakers of color; and 
(2) the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence does little 
to mitigate this problem generally and even less when the non-
conforming speech is indicative of the speaker’s social inequality. 
C. Rankin v. McPherson:  The Black Assassin 
Ardith McPherson, a Black woman who worked as a clerical in a 
constable’s office in Texas,76 was an unlikely spokesperson for African 
Americans, but when she spoke the sentiments of her identity group 
regarding the policies of President Ronald Reagan, she assumed this 
mantel, even if inadvertently.  McPherson’s speech regarding the 
policies of a popular president in a region of the country where his 
popularity was greatest was socially taboo fare⎯speech that violated 
general norms about how race and racism are to be discussed as well 
as the specific culture of her workplace.  Moreover, the reaction to 
her speech, both from four Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court and from her employer, illustrates how Black oppositional 
speech is often re-interpreted by institutional actors to fit the 
stereotype that such actors harbor of Blacks in general, outspoken 
Blacks in particular. 
Because former President Ronald Reagan has now been deified, it 
may be difficult for many to remember the social divisions he 
engendered as president.  Reagan was as wildly unpopular among 
                                                          
 76. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987) (describing her duties as 
“purely clerical,” although her official title was deputy constable). 
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African Americans as he was popular among most White voters.77  He 
did little to dispel African Americans’ suspicions that his 
“conservatism” was at least in part a stalking horse for racial 
regression.78  Indeed, a majority of Blacks viewed Reagan as a 
“racist.”79  Reagan began his 1980 campaign in Philadelphia, 
Mississippi, a town associated with some of the worst violence against 
civil rights activists during the 1960s.80  The President’s crusade 
against welfare cheats had a racial cast to it, as it was widely—though 
inaccurately—perceived by White voters that Blacks made up the bulk 
of welfare recipients.81  Reagan aggressively opposed affirmative 
action82 and nominated to the federal bench judges who took the 
narrowest view of constitutional provisions and statutory rights whose 
                                                          
 77. See THEODORE RUETER, THE POLITICS OF RACE:  AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 247–48 (1995) (noting that Reagan had received the lowest 
percentage of Black votes of any Republican presidential candidate and perhaps any 
Republican candidate for any office in American history). 
 78. See id. at 47 (describing Reagan as “a chief apostle of contemporary racial 
conservatism”). 
 79. An ABC News poll found that 56% of Blacks viewed Reagan as a racist.  
Milton Coleman, Reagan Rating Falls in Poll of Blacks:  56% Say President Is a Racist, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1986, at A1.  See also ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Do You 
Think of Ronald Reagan as a Racist?, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
(Jan. 14, 1986), http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest86.out_4299&type= 
hitlist&num=0 (summarizing the results of the poll, which six years into Reagan’s 
presidency found that 56% of Blacks thought Reagan was a racist). 
Most White voters were fully cognizant that Reagan’s policies were harming 
Blacks.  A 1986 poll by the Joint Center for Political Studies asked:  “Do you think 
that Reagan’s policies have been harmful to blacks or not?”  A striking 72% of the 
White respondents answered yes.  Joint Center for Political Studies, Do You Think 
That Reagan’s Policies Have Been Harmful to Blacks or Not? (1986), 
http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest86.out_4302&type=hitlist&num=3.  
Yet a majority of White voters still had a favorable opinion of President Reagan 
throughout his presidency.  See CBS News/New York Times Poll, Is your opinion of 
Ronald Reagan favorable, not favorable, undecided, or haven’t you heard enough 
about Ronald Reagan yet to have an opinion?, The Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research (April 12, 1990), http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest90.out_9 
035&type=hitlist&num=0  (indicating that 59% of Whites had a “favorable” opinion 
of Reagan in 1984 and 51% of Whites had a “favorable” opinion in 1990).  
Furthermore, a substantial plurality of Whites approved of Reagan’s performance on 
civil rights issues for minorities, even though they understood Reagan to be harming 
Blacks.  Joint Center for Political Studies, Do You Approve or Disapprove of the Way 
President Reagan Is Handling the Civil Rights of Minority Groups? (1986), 
http://poll.orspub.com/document.php?id=quest86.out_4301&type=hitlist&num=2.   
 80. PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH:  THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 300 (1999) (noting that White voters were 
not offended by the symbolism of Reagan commencing his campaign by declaring “I 
believe in states’ rights” in a town where local Whites had murdered three civil rights 
workers). 
 81. See id. (arguing that Reagan’s crusade against “big government” focused 
mainly on programs that Whites identified with Blacks, namely welfare and food 
stamps). 
 82. See HAROLD C. FLEMING & VIRGINIA FLEMING, THE POTOMAC CHRONICLE:  
PUBLIC POLICY AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN 251 (1996) (detailing the 
Reagan administration’s sustained attack on affirmative action). 
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implementation profoundly affected the everyday lives of Americans 
of color.83 
McPherson shared the abiding suspicions of Reagan harbored by 
most African Americans.  In 1981, she and some coworkers learned 
over an office radio of John Hinckley’s attempted assassination of 
President Reagan.84  McPherson shortly thereafter engaged a 
coworker (who was also her boyfriend) in a conversation, her 
recollection of which went as follows: 
Q:  What did you say? 
A:  I said I felt that that would happen sooner or later. 
Q:  Okay.  And what did Lawrence say? 
A:  Lawrence said, yeah, agreeing with me. 
Q: Okay.  Now, when you—after Lawrence spoke, then what was 
your next comment? 
A: Well, we were talking—it’s a wonder why they did that.  I felt like 
it would be a black person that did that, because I feel like most of 
my kind is on welfare and CETA, and they use [M]edicaid, and at 
the time, I was thinking that’s what it was. . . . But then after I said 
that, and then Lawrence said, yeah, he’s cutting back [M]edicaid 
and food stamps.  And I said, yeah, welfare and CETA.  I said, 
shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they get him.85 
Although McPherson and her boyfriend believed they were in a 
room by themselves, her last remark was overheard by a coworker 
who in turn reported it to Constable Rankin.86  When asked by 
Rankin if she made the remark, McPherson responded, “Yes, but I 
didn’t mean anything by it.”87  She was immediately fired.88 
McPherson brought suit alleging a violation of her First 
Amendment rights.  Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall first noted the classic duality of the government employer:  
it is both an employer concerned with the efficient operation of the 
government’s affairs and a public entity bound by the constraints of 
the First Amendment.89  As such, the government employer cannot 
dismiss or discipline an employee merely because the employer 
disagrees with the content of her speech.90  Rather, the threshold 
                                                          
 83. See KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 80, at 302 (discussing Reagan’s efforts to 
stack the federal bench with “racial conservatives”). 
 84. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 381–82. 
 88. Id. at 382. 
 89. Id. at 384. 
 90. Id. 
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question in determining whether McPherson’s dismissal was 
constitutional was whether her speech was “on a matter of public 
concern.”91  This determination in turn depended on the content, 
form, and context of McPherson’s statements.  If McPherson’s speech 
was on a matter of public concern, her interest in making her 
statement had to be weighed against the employer’s interest in 
efficiency, considering such issues as her speech’s interference with 
work, personal relationships, and intra-office harmony.92 
Justice Marshall disposed of the first issue with dispatch.  Because 
McPherson’s statement was not a threat to kill the President, but 
rather was a controversial coda in a discussion about President 
Reagan’s policies that transpired after an attempt on his life, her 
speech was clearly on a matter of public concern.93  In so holding, 
Marshall eschewed a characterization of McPherson’s speech that 
appeared apt, particularly in light of his otherwise gratuitous 
reference to McPherson as “a black woman.”94  Under the eschewed 
depiction of her speech, McPherson’s speech was about racial 
discrimination, which, according to the Court’s prior case law, was “a 
matter inherently of public concern.”95  The Court’s identification of 
racial discrimination as a matter of public concern, however, is a 
classic illustration of the disconnect between pronouncements of law 
by the Court and social transformation.  If racial discrimination is “a 
matter inherently of public concern,” it is also a tinderbox, so much 
so that avoidance of the charge is one reason for the lack of 
socialization between Whites and Blacks.96 
But McPherson’s termination can be understood to reflect more 
than the taboo and stultification around race talk in America.  She 
prevailed in the Supreme Court by one vote against four Justices who 
ascribed violent motive to her speech in much the same way my 
colleagues had instrumentally translated my own speech.  Consider 
Justice Scalia’s apoplectic dissent, which reflects a broader stereotype 
about Black self-assertion: 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 384–85. 
 92. Id. at 388–89. 
 93. Id. at 386. 
 94. Id. at 380. 
 95. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983) (citing Givhan v. W. Line 
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979)). 
 96. See J. Nicole Shelton & Jennifer A. Richeson, Intergroup Contact and Pluralistic 
Ignorance, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 97 (2005) (“Whites anticipate that 
out-group members will perceive them as being cold and prejudiced and, as a 
consequence, will behave negatively toward them. . . . Whites explain their avoidance 
of intergroup contact as a result of their concerns about being rejected because of 
their race.”). 
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Given the meaning of the remark, there is no basis for the Court’s 
suggestion that McPherson’s criticisms of the President’s policies 
that immediately preceded the remark can illuminate it in such a 
fashion as to render it constitutionally protected.  Those criticisms 
merely reveal the speaker’s motive for expressing the desire that the 
next attempt on the President’s life succeed, in the same way that a 
political assassin’s remarks to his victim before pulling the trigger 
might reveal a motive for that crime.  The majority’s magical 
transformation of the motive for McPherson’s statement into its 
content is as misguided as viewing a political assassination preceded 
by a harangue as nothing more than a strong denunciation of the 
victim’s political views.97 
Speech by a Black man accusing a law school of discrimination 
against teaching applicants is re-interpreted as incivility.  Speech by a 
clerical accusing the President of discrimination is likened to an 
assassination plot.  Social psychology offers insights into the disparity 
between speech and perception.  Studies suggest that a racial 
minority’s social inequality has a negative impact on the listener’s 
perception of what is said.  These studies do not focus on political 
speech as such.  Instead, they examine so-called ambiguously 
aggressive acts by both White and Black subjects to determine 
whether those acts are interpreted similarly by an observer.  A 1980 
study by Sagar and Schofield in the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology concluded as follows: 
[E]ven relatively innocuous acts by black males are likely to be 
considered more threatening than the same behaviors by white 
males.  This tendency to perceive threat in blacks’ behaviors 
appears to be all too generalizable to a number of situations and 
populations in this country.  It occurred in Duncan’s study in 
which white college students saw one confederate give another a 
light shove in the context of a rather heated discussion.  It 
appeared again in this study as sixth-grade students judged four 
different interaction types that involved no direct suggestion of 
anger and, in two cases, no physical contact whatsoever.  Most 
notably, in this study behavior ratings by black students reflected 
the same antiblack bias as those by white students.98 
                                                          
 97. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 396–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 98. H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black 
and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 590, 596 (1980). 
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Sagar and Schofield and other social psychologists reveal how 
people of color become victims of “differential social perception.”99  
Predicated on psychology’s empiricism that “we tend to perceive what 
we wish or expect to perceive,”100 testing of the differential social 
perception hypothesis has found that Whites have a lower threshold 
for perceiving an act as violent when the actor is Black than when a 
White performs the very same act.101  The intrusion of racial 
stereotypes into social perceptions has been demonstrated to affect 
the speed with which Whites identify weapons102 and the rate at which 
they misidentify a harmless object as a weapon.103 
Regardless of the experimental context, however, if racial 
stereotype taints our perception of ambiguously aggressive behavior 
by Blacks, it undoubtedly taints our perception of self-assertive 
behavior by Blacks, particularly when the behavior is speech about 
race itself, speech associated with the actor’s social inequality.  
Sociolinguists’ study of cultural communication norms supplies a 
critical insight into the cognitive and rhetorical dissonance between 
Justice Marshall’s and Justice Scalia’s perceptions of McPherson’s 
speech: 
Many of the more assertive and aggressive African American 
behaviors (e.g., shouting, threatening) are not in the realm of 
typical public behavior for European Americans and signal 
impending physical violence when presented.  European 
Americans may interpret African American behavior as signaling 
physical confrontation when none is intended, particularly when 
the behavior includes shouting, animated gesturing, and staring.  
Kochman (1981) argues that relative confidence in the ability to 
deal with anger is the basis for these divergent perceptions. . . . 
African Americans have less need to repress these feelings and 
                                                          
 99. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:  
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 
590–98 (1976).  
 100. Id. at 590. 
 101. Id. at 596.  Like Sagar and Schofield’s experiment, Duncan’s involved a series 
of taped vignettes, the scripts for which varied only with respect to the race of the 
harm-doer and the victim.  The discussion between the actors becomes somewhat 
excited and culminates in one actor lightly shoving the other.  The tapes were shown 
individually to 104 White undergraduate students attending the University of 
California at Irvine.  When the harm-doer was Black, 75% of the students described 
his actions as violent, whereas when the harm-doer was White and the victim Black, 
only 17% of the subjects labeled the behavior as violent.  Id. at 595. 
 102. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception:  The Role of Automatic and Controlled 
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 187 (2001) 
(“[N]on-Black participants were faster to identify guns when they were primed by 
Black versus White faces.”). 
 103. Id. at 188. 
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their expressions since they believe they can control the escalation 
of events.104 
If racial stereotypicality permeates a Supreme Court Justice’s view 
of McPherson’s language, it is not difficult to understand how it may 
have infected her supervisor’s decision to terminate her.  Antiblack 
mythology is ingrained into the sub-conscience of White Americans.  
The discipline of social psychology confirms that much racism is 
aversive in character and arises from deep-seated cognitive and 
attitudinal biases.105  As a working-class Black woman, McPherson’s 
speech on a matter of public concern potentially primed a number of 
such biases held by her White superior, Rankin.106  For instance, 
Whites attempt to conceal the existence of racism in the United 
States by insisting that equal opportunity exists for all.107  Speech such 
as McPherson’s that challenges this notion by questioning the racial 
sensitivity of the President of the United States may have upset White 
norms.  Likewise, the stereotype of the indolent Black welfare 
recipient is common among White Americans.108  McPherson’s 
defense of welfare and similar programs may have activated that 
stereotype.  In any case, the power differential between McPherson 
and her boss made it more likely that Rankin would bring to bear 
negative stereotypes in his decision-making, for social psychology 
confirms that the situational inequality of a minority increases the 
tendency of Whites to deploy such stereotypes.109  So, too, does a 
heightened emotional state, which Rankin was likely experiencing 
upon hearing McPherson’s remarks.110 
As a social unequal, McPherson’s exercise of her First Amendment 
rights was freighted with these and other disabilities.  Had she been a 
                                                          
 104. MICHAEL L. HECHT ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNICATION: ETHNIC 
IDENTITY AND CULTURAL INTERPRETATION 105 (Language & Language Behaviors vol. 2, 
1993). 
 105. Krieger, supra note 39, at 1188–91. 
 106. See Email from Jeri Costello, Constable, to Terry Smith (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file 
with author) (stating that Rankin is White, though his race is omitted from the case). 
 107. See JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM:  THE BASICS 150–51 (1st ed. 
1995) (outlining “the gospel of the work ethic” that is so central to the White 
conception of self). 
 108. Id. at 151. 
 109. See Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on 
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181 (2003) 
(“[P]articipants [in the study] exposed to a black subordinate . . . revealed greater 
automatic racial bias . . . than participants anticipating an interaction with a black 
superior”); id. (“Situational power is known to influence the extent to which 
individuals engage in category-based information processing, such as stereotyping.”). 
 110. See Hai-Sook Kim & Robert S. Baron, Exercise and the Illusory Correlation:  Does 
Arousal Heighten Stereotypic Processing?, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 366–80 
(1988) (confirming the correlation between physiological arousal and an increased 
tendency to perceive stereotypical similarities). 
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Black man and spoken the same words, the racialization of her 
speech may well have been greater.  The threat perception by Whites 
is greater when assertive conduct is engaged in by Black males, 
regardless of age.111  I had understood this during my years of 
advocating for minority hiring and refusing to be co-opted or coerced 
into silence.  My activism prompted two White colleagues to 
comment to another that the law school would not likely hire another 
Black man in the near future.  The colleague to whom the remark 
was made admonished them that their disposition smacked of illegal 
discrimination, among other opprobrium.  The anti-racist norm 
transgressors112 instantly sought refuge in what sociolinguist Teun van 
Dijk has termed “transfer[ring] the charge to others:  ‘I have nothing 
against blacks, but my neighbours (customers, etc.). . . .’”113  Although 
the norm transgressors disassociated themselves from their own 
statements, fifteen years after my hiring, I remained one of two Black 
male faculty members, the other having been hired at the same time 
as I. 
As different as McPherson’s motivations to speak may have been 
from mine—she appears to have been engaged in casual 
conversation, I in a cause—the convergence in the treatment of our 
speech, its racialization, is remarkable and suggests the limitations of 
current First Amendment doctrine to protect public sector workers 
like McPherson.  Pickering/Connick’s balancing test, coupled with its 
recent hollowing by Garcetti, is a baleful invitation for the public 
employee to address a matter of public concern where the employee 
                                                          
 111. Sagar & Schofield, supra note 98, at 596; see Wendy Berry Mendes et al., 
Challenge and Threat During Social Interactions with White and Black Men, 28 PERSONALITY 
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Agenda:  Exploring the Meaning of Gender Disparities Among Blacks in Higher Education, 60 
J. NEGRO EDUC. 19, 23 (1991))) (quotations omitted). 
 112. See David Mellor et al., The Perception of Racism in Ambiguous Scenarios, 27 J. 
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 473, 473 (2001) (asserting that overt racism is viewed as 
politically unacceptable in the United States). 
 113. Teun A. van Dijk, Denying Racism:  Elite Discourse and Racism, in RACISM AND 
MIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 179, 181 (J. Solomos & J. Wrench eds., 1993), 
available at http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Denying%20racism%20-%20Elite 
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is already more likely to be the victim of discrimination.  The slender 
one-vote reed on which McPherson’s victory in the Supreme Court 
hung suggests that First Amendment public employee jurisprudence 
does not account for the social inequality of speakers and is thus 
unable to effectively intervene in the economy of racialization in the 
workplace. 
D. Ward Churchill and Heretic Voices of Color in a Moment of Unity 
Professor Ward Churchill is a Native American scholar and activist 
who is not ocularly identifiable as a racial minority. His statements 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, would 
eventually cause him to be repeatedly identified as a Native American 
and marginalized for bringing to bear “an Indian point of view” 
about contested issues of Native American history,114 even as his own 
authenticity as a Native American was questioned by critics.  In the 
process of this controversy’s unfolding, Churchill would find himself 
in the company of a distinct minority—some of the most prominent 
members of which were Black Americans—who did not outwardly 
conform to post-9/11 expectations of good citizenship.115  In an essay 
entitled “Some People Push Back”:  On the Justice of Roosting Chickens, 
Churchill questioned the innocence of those who perished in the 
World Trade Center because they had, however passively, supported 
the United States’ surgical bombing of Iraq that had led to the deaths 
of 500,000 Iraqi children.116  Likening Americans’ support of the 
bombing of Iraq during the Gulf War and afterwards to German 
                                                          
 114. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, Professor of Ethnic Studies, 
University of Colorado at Boulder, in Boulder, Colo. (Mar. 9, 2007). 
 115. See Edward Epstein, Lone Dissenter in House War Vote is Oakland’s Lee, S.F. 
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National Unity, L.A. SENTINEL, Sept. 27, 2001, at A1 (two American Black Muslim 
firefighters in Miami-Dade County refused to ride fire engines featuring the 
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 116. Churchill, supra note 18. 
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citizens’ support for Adolf Hitler, Churchill said of the World Trade 
Center victims: 
To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs and 
consequences to others of what they were involved in—and in 
many cases excelling at—it was because of their absolute refusal to 
see.  More likely, it was because they were too busy braying, 
incessantly and self-importantly, into their cell phones, arranging 
power lunches and stock transactions, each of which translated, 
conveniently out of sight, mind and smelling distance, into the 
starved and rotting flesh of infants.  If there was a better, more 
effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting 
their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile 
sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d really be interested in hearing 
about it.117 
“Little Eichmanns” is a reference to Adolf Eichmann, an architect of 
the Holocaust.118 
Although the media and press focused on the above-quoted 
statement, which itself makes no reference to race, the broader scope 
of the essay (or as Churchill calls it, the op-ed piece119) expresses an 
ethno-contrarian perspective, borrowing its title from Malcolm X’s 
infamous reaction to the assassination of John F. Kennedy—“chickens 
coming home to roost”—and describing Iraqi children killed during 
America’s bombing campaign as “vast legions of brown-skinned five-
year-olds . . . shivering in the dark, wide-eyed in horror, whimpering 
as they expired in the most agonizing ways imaginable.”120  The essay 
represented his “intellectual understanding as a person of color” of 
the events of 9/11.121  Unlike Ceballos or McPherson, Churchill’s 
speech was race-conscious and represented a form of identity 
advocacy.122  Although his speech’s point of entry into the economy of 
                                                          
 117. Id. 
 118. See Michelle York, Remark on 9/11 Sparks Storm at College, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2005, at B3 (describing Eichmann as “the architect of the plan to exterminate the 
Jews”).  Churchill disputes the popular media’s understanding of Eichmann’s role in 
the Holocaust and hence of Churchill’s analogy:  “The comparison was of 
technocrats.  Eichmann is someone who, after all, killed no one.  He made the trains 
run on time.”  Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 119. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 120. Churchill, supra note 18. 
 121. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 122. Although the essay represented his intellectual understanding of 9/11 as a 
person of color, Churchill believes that “a White person would end up with the same 
intellectual understanding as a person of color” if the White person possessed a 
factual understanding of United States history.  Id.  By this, Churchill does not imply 
that the thoughts he articulated in the essay were shared by people of color but not 
by Whites.  Id.  Indeed, there appears to be no polling data taken in the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 seeking to gauge racial differences in the perception 
of events.  Whether mass silence and expressions of empathy after 9/11 can be taken 
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racialization differs somewhat from the prior narratives, Churchill 
believes that his social inequality, his status as a self-identifying person 
of color, figured determinatively in the amplitude with which his 
speech was heard. 
Churchill’s controversial post-9/11 essay did not exist in a vacuum; 
it was part of a continuum of a decades-long political and scholarly 
activism in the Native American Movement.  In January of 2005, 
Hamilton College in New York rescinded a speaking invitation to 
Churchill because of the essay, though the piece by then was three 
years old and had gone largely unnoticed.123  Shortly before Hamilton 
College’s negation, Churchill had been a defendant in a criminal trial 
in which he and others were indicted for their actions in connection 
with a protest of a Denver-area Columbus Day celebration, an event 
which Churchill believes glorifies the genocide of Indians.124  
Representing himself pro se, Churchill used the trial as a teaching 
moment about the genocide.125  After his acquittal, Churchill held a 
news conference, a victory lap of sorts.  The celebration would be a 
tempered one, for Hamilton College’s revocation of its invitation and 
the flap over his 9/11 comments would follow shortly.  These 
controversies, in Churchill’s view, were part of a different continuum:  
a sustained effort to blunt his “counter-hegemonic interpretation of 
American history and social order.”126 
In the ensuing controversy, race would present itself as a paradox 
of sorts.  Although hate mail and threats of violence referenced 
Churchill’s Native American heritage derogatorily, others—including 
at one point, Churchill’s employer, the University of Colorado—
                                                          
as national unity across races is a complex inquiry.  See Norma Adams-Wade, A 
Different Perspective on Sept. 11, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2001, at 18A (noting 
that prominent Black activists had withheld criticism of United States policy in the 
wake of 9/11). 
 Churchill’s personal experience in receiving approximately 8,000 emails following 
the inception of the controversy over his essay was that of those who identified 
themselves racially or whose race could be discerned, the emails reacting negatively 
to the essay were almost exclusively from Whites while those from people of color 
were positive.  Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 123. The College, however, did not initially revoke its invitation to Churchill; 
rather, it changed his appearance to a “panel discussion.”  York, supra note 118.  
Churchill’s visit was ultimately cancelled after Hamilton College received more than 
6,000 emails objecting to Churchill’s visit, and Churchill and Hamilton College officials 
received threats of violence.  Patrick D. Healy, College Cancels Speech Over 9/11 
Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at B1. 
 124. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 125. According to Churchill, “the argument to genocide is key to all of my work.”  
Id. 
 126. Id. 
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questioned the authenticity of his heritage.127  The former conduct, 
which the university apparently ignored,128 is easily recognized as 
unadorned racialization.  The inquisition into Churchill’s heritage, 
however, is less cognizable as the deployment of race to de-legitimate 
Churchill’s speech, since on its face it appears to be an effort to 
remove the cloak of race from the controversy.  But such questions of 
authenticity sought to undermine Churchill’s overall credibility.129  
Moreover, from Churchill’s point of view, the questions were an 
exercise in the ultimate kind of racial supremacy.  “The power is in 
the naming,” according to Churchill.130  The questions around 
authenticity conveyed the message, “You will be who you’re told to 
be.”131 
The University of Colorado eventually conceded that it could not 
discipline Churchill for his remarks about 9/11.132  Nevertheless, 
undeterred by appearances of pretext,133 the university brought 
charges of “research misconduct” against Churchill on the heels of 
                                                          
 127. See Kirk Johnson, University Changes Its Focus in Investigation of Professor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A9 (“Detractors of Professor Churchill came out of the 
woodwork, questioning his claim to be part Indian.”).  The University of Colorado 
undertook a preliminary review of allegations that Churchill had fabricated his 
Indian heritage and referred the matter for further investigation because his Indian 
identity was “material to his scholarship.”  Report on Conclusion of Preliminary 
Review in the Matter of Professor Ward Churchill (Mar. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/report.html. 
 128. An Open Letter from the Department of Ethnic Studies, University of 
Colorado at Boulder to the Board of Regents, President Betsy Hoffman and Interim 
Chancellor Phil DiStefano (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://wardchurchill.net/files 
/b_ethnic_studies_open_letter.pdf (“The University is well aware that Ward 
Churchill and other members of the Department have been subjected to death 
threats, threats of violence and overtly racist attacks.  It could have publicly 
condemned these threats of violence and expressions of racial hostility.  Instead, its 
stunning silence has effectively empowered the attackers to continue.”). 
 129. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  Others, however, viewed questions about the authenticity of Churchill’s 
Native American heritage as being integral to questions about the integrity of his 
scholarship.  See, e.g., David Kelly, Colorado Professor Faces Claims of Academic Fraud, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2005, at A17 (noting critics ascribed a motive to Churchill’s 
questioning “blood quantum” standards for Indians in federal law:  “Critics say 
Churchill’s motives were clear:  As long as tribes required some standard of proof for 
membership, he would never be admitted.”). 
 132. Johnson, supra note 127. 
 133. Because the research misconduct inquiry followed so closely on the heels of 
the controversy surrounding Churchill’s 9/11 remarks, the use of research 
misconduct as a basis for terminating Churchill likely creates a mixed-motive First 
Amendment case, in which the university must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached that same decision to terminate Churchill even 
in the absence of his 9/11 comments.  See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (stating that the board of education must show by a 
preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same employment 
decision even in the absence of a teacher’s protected statements). 
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the public controversy over his 9/11 remarks.  The charges centered 
on “a small fraction of Professor Churchill’s extensive body of 
academic work,” in most instances focusing on “no more than a few 
paragraphs within much longer essays . . . .”134  The Committee 
investigating the charges consisted of no Native Americans and no 
scholars of Native American Studies, a subset of Ethnic Studies, the 
department in which Churchill was tenured.135  From Churchill’s 
standpoint—one symbolically corroborated by the Committee’s 
composition—the investigation was an attempt at “re-asserting white 
expertise, white authority, white interpretation.”136 
The Committee issued a 124-page report finding Churchill guilty 
of research misconduct and recommending that he be de-tenured 
and terminated.137  An appreciation of the report’s broader context is 
essential to any assessment of the role of race, real or perceived, in 
the report’s production.  On the one hand, the Committee 
acknowledged that the timing of its investigation was suspect, and it 
questioned the university’s motives in pursuing the charges.138  This 
acknowledgment, however, had the whiff of a prelude, for the 
Committee proceeded as if its own actions could be hermitically 
cordoned off from the events that precipitated—or least inarguably 
preceded—its constitution.  On the other hand, the Committee 
acknowledged that the essays under scrutiny were “broad accounts” 
for which “extensive notes would not be expected or required.”139  
The Committee then undertook a minutely detailed inspection of 
Churchill’s footnotes.  Where one omission or mistake was 
insufficient to constitute a basis for a finding of research misconduct, 
                                                          
 134. Report of the Investigative Committee of the Standing Committee on 
Research Misconduct at the University of Colorado at Boulder Concerning 
Allegations of Academic Misconduct Against Professor Ward Churchill, May 9, 2006, 
at 8, available at http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/download/Ward 
ChurchillReport.pdf [hereinafter Report on Research Misconduct]. 
 135. Id. at 103–05.  The Committee did have as a member a Chicano, José Limón.  
Churchill describes Limón as “[t]he Whitest person on the panel.”  Telephone 
Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.  He adds, “People of color serving in 
this capacity are striving to be whiter than White.”  Id.  Here, Churchill is alluding to 
the phenomenon of “exceptionalism.”  Exceptionalism is an implicit pact between 
Whites seeking cover from the charge of racism and a person of color seeking to 
ingratiate himself with those Whites to ostracize an outspoken person of color.  See 
Smith, supra note 36, at 546 n.111 (explaining that exceptionalism entails elevating 
some members of the subordinate group above others, where the White decision-
maker may essentially tell the preferred minority that he is not like the others). 
 136. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 137. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 99.  The disciplinary 
recommendation, which was not part of the university’s charge to the Committee, 
was not unanimous.  Id. at 102. 
 138. Id. at 4. 
 139. Id. at 10. 
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the Committee bootstrapped that omission or mistake to others to 
find a “pattern,” parts of which depended on the others for 
substantive significance.140  Finally, the Committee purported not to 
act as arbiters of contested historical fact in Native American 
history.141  Yet its enterprise inexorably devolved into the realm of 
arbiter at several points in its report.142  In sum, any evaluation of 
whether race affected the Committee’s interpretation of and reaction 
to Churchill’s speech (specifically, his scholarship) must bear in mind 
the aegis under which the Committee was constituted and the cross-
purposes that its charge appeared to impose on it. 
Sociolinguist Teun van Dijk posits, “If knowledge is power, then 
knowledge of other people may be an instrument of power over other 
people.  This truism is especially relevant in examining the academic 
discourse of race and ethnicity.”143  If the inquiry into Churchill’s 
scholarship was a contrived metamorphosis of identity-based remarks 
about 9/11 into concerns about academic integrity, it was likewise a 
foray (even if inadvertent) into the controversial question of who 
should control historical narrative—who, in van Dijk’s terms, shall 
exercise power.  Churchill is raced in this inquisition, not because of 
its inherently racial properties—that would be a tautology—but 
rather because the Committee suffuses its situational power with 
characteristics of racial hegemony.  A central charge of research 
misconduct against Churchill focused on whether he exaggerated his 
claims that the United States Army intentionally spread smallpox to 
Mandan Indians by distributing infected blankets to them.  The 
report concludes that Churchill “fabricated” his account,144 and that it 
                                                          
 140. Compare id. at 73 (noting that the omission of the page number of a source 
was not serious “unless it forms part of a pattern”), with id. at 82 (aggregating 
Churchill’s alleged mistakes to find the requisite pattern). 
 141. See id. at 12 (“The Committee stresses that we were not charged with 
determining what actually happened in southern New England in 1614–1618 or Fort 
Clark, North Dakota, in 1837.  We have accordingly not tried to produce our own 
account of those events.”). 
 142. See id. at 94 (“Professor Churchill was disrespectful of Indian oral traditions 
when dealing with the Mandan/Fort Clark smallpox epidemic of 1837.”); id. at 97 
(acknowledging genocidal campaigns against Indians but finding that Churchill had 
exaggerated his claims); id. at 65 (acknowledging that members of the United States 
Army held “strong anti-Indian views” but concluding there was “no evidence to 
support Professor Churchill’s claim that the U.S. Army intended to kill off the 
Mandan Indians”).  In a puzzling admission that belied its ability to settle the 
disputed matters of history before it, though it embarked on precisely that task, the 
Committee conceded that “we have not attempted to examine every possible work 
written on the topics in question:  we have merely examined the evidence relevant to 
his particular claims.”  Id. at 12. 
 143. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 158. 
 144. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 68. 
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could find “no evidence to support this claim.”145  The Committee 
does not question that genocide was attempted on American 
Indians,146 nor does it appear to question that smallpox was one agent 
of the attempted genocide.  This is for good reason, for prominent 
historians have documented the use of biological warfare against the 
Indians.147  Moreover, there is abundant historical evidence that the 
United States Army was instrumental in carrying out the attempted 
genocide against the Indians,148 even if the specific means of 
annihilation is subject to debate. 
That the Committee held Churchill to a more exacting standard 
because of the role of ethnicity is evidenced by the language of the 
report itself.  “The interdisciplinary work and social commitment of 
ethnic studies scholars may require an even stronger fealty to 
standards of veracity and evidence,” the Committee wrote,149 
presaging the standards under which it would judge Churchill’s 
scholarship.  Although such paternalism does not necessarily equate 
to racism, it harkens to a frequent strategy of Whites met with a claim 
of racism, particularly when the claim is unorthodox or radical in 
nature.  The “irritation with minority radicals who are seen as 
‘exaggerating’” is one symptom of modern institutional racism in 
academia.150  Both within and outside of academia, Whites respond 
defensively to charges of racism with the challenge to “prove it!”—
and not merely by inference.151  In holding fast to footnote details 
that it initially acknowledged were not even necessary to be provided, 
                                                          
 145. Id. at 69. 
 146. Id. at 97. 
 147. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 87 (1999) 
(documenting the use of smallpox-infected blankets by the British Army against 
Indians in lands west of the Appalachians and describing this stratagem as “a 
pioneering effort at what is now called biological warfare”). 
 148. See, e.g., WILLIAM LOREN KATZ, BLACK INDIANS:  A HIDDEN HERITAGE 55–57 
(1997) (detailing the United States military’s role in quashing Seminole Indian 
resistance at “Fort Negro”:  “[f]or years, the U.S. sent its enormous resources of 
troops, ships, and military supplies to crush Seminole resistance to its slaveholding 
way of life”). 
 149. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 6; see also id. at 97 (“[T]he 
damage done to the reputation of ethnic studies as a field . . . is a consideration in 
our assessment of the seriousness of Professor Churchill’s conduct.”). 
 150. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 195. 
 151. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:  
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1378 (1992) 
(“When a white person hears a black person use a word like ‘racist,’ the response is 
often a strong defensive reaction that implicitly says to the black person, ‘prove it!’  
And the standards of proof are those white people are comfortable with:  evidence of 
conscious racial animus, intent to harm and degrade.”). 
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the Committee exhibited these common traits of White supremacy in 
discourse.152 
Churchill himself is less certain about another regard in which the 
Committee arguably subordinated him based on his social inequality.  
At the conclusion of its report, the Committee opines on Churchill’s 
attitude, his collegiality or lack thereof, and his alleged propensity for 
the ad hominem in responding to critics.153  Churchill initially 
observed that these comments “could be” racial in nature but later 
more strongly characterized them as being part of the “recantation 
dimension” of the Committee’s efforts.154  According to Churchill, in 
seeking contrition from him, the Committee behaved as if it were 
asking him to “prove that I’m subjugated to you [the Committee].”155  
Professor Sumi Cho has addressed the racial dimension of collegiality 
standards: 
“Collegial” is what those in power happen to define it as at the 
time.  As such, it absorbs the normative values of the dominant 
culture.  Thus, the utter malleability of the term poses the same 
dangers to particular identity groups as any other doctrine or rule 
that suffers from over-vagueness. . . . Under this “can’t we all get 
along” formulation, those who transgress the cultural norm of 
gendered and racial hierarchy appear to be “impolite” and 
“uncollegial” regardless of history, context, or power relations.156 
The context and mechanisms for the racialization of Ward 
Churchill and his speech and scholarship are complex and have the 
character of both motivational and cognitive behavior.  Yet Churchill 
believes his racialization is at its root quite simple.  Regarding the 
9/11 essay, Churchill opines, “I don’t think a White person would 
have written it,” and if he had, the University of Colorado “would have 
simply tried to ignore it.”157 
                                                          
 152. The Committee condescendingly attributed Churchill’s alleged research 
misconduct to his lack of formal training in history and lack of a doctorate degree.  
See Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 100.  The racial connotations 
of this language rest not in elitism—for such is perhaps an endemic characteristic of 
the academy—but rather in its skewed application.  Whites have assumed some of the 
most important positions in our society without the formal credentials for doing so.  
See, e.g., RAVI BATRA, GREENSPAN’S FRAUD 81 (2005) (recounting Alan Greenspan’s 
appointment as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors despite his lack of a 
Ph.D. and lack of scholarship). 
 153. Report on Research Misconduct, supra note 134, at 98. 
 154. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Cho, supra note 35, at 809. 
 157. Telephone Interview with Ward Churchill, supra note 114.  Churchill uses 
Noam Chomsky, a controversial White professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, as a point of comparison.  Id.  But even White elected officials have made 
statements substantively similar to Churchill’s, and they have been lauded for their 
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E. Leonard Jeffries:  The Black Racist 
Leonard Jeffries158 is a “racist.”  He is not a racist because he denied 
people jobs or other opportunities based on their race.  Nor did he 
gain this disrepute by committing an act of racial violence.  Instead, 
he is a racist because of the way he discussed racism.  In criticizing 
public school curricula as racially biased, Jeffries laced his oratory 
with the miasma of ethnic insult.  He referred to various state and 
federal officials as an “ultimate, supreme, sophisticated, debonair 
racist” and a “sophisticated, Texas Jew.”159  He accused “rich Jews” of 
having financed the slave trade.160  He also opined that Jews and 
“Mafia figures” in the media conspired to negatively portray and 
thereby destroy Blacks.161 
In addition to ethnic stereotyping, Jeffries’s speech was 
controversial because it was at points specific, lambasting not Whites 
generally—for which he would have been charged with 
overbreadth—but Jews directly and Italians indirectly.  The broader 
purpose of Jeffries’s speech, and whatever legitimacy that purpose 
might have had, was subsumed by his choice of language.  Jeffries is 
racist because in the American dialectic on race, Americans have 
equated racial insult with other kinds of racism and have placed the 
speaker on a par with other racist actors.162  If, however, Ardith 
                                                          
honesty rather than persecuted.  For instance, Congressman Ron Paul of Texas, a 
2008 presidential aspirant, recently said the following about 9/11: 
Have you ever read the reasons they attacked us?  They attacked us because 
we’ve been over there; we’ve been bombing Iraq for 10 years. . . . I’m 
suggesting that we listen to the people who attacked us and the reason they 
did it, and they are delighted that we’re over there because Osama bin 
Laden has said, “I’m glad you’re over on our sand because we can target you 
so much easier.” 
Editorial, Between the Lines at the GOP Debate, II:  Ron Paul Has Earned His Place at the 
Podium, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 18, 2007, http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/ 
opinion/editorials/article_1698826.php. 
 The conservative Orange County Register praised Paul’s honesty.  See id. (criticizing 
Paul’s political opponents for mischaracterizing his forthright statements regarding 
the causes of the 9/11 attacks, and implying that Paul’s campaign continues to “gain 
steam” because of his honesty).  So, too, did numerous other publications, such as 
the less ideological Des Moines Register.  See David Yepsen, Editorial, Romney, Paul, 
Giuliani All ‘Win’ in GOP Debate, DES MOINES REG., May 17, 2007, at A15 (noting that 
Paul’s opposition to the war may help him gain some support if the GOP does not 
fare well in 2008). 
 158. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), modified by 52 F.3d 9 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
 159. Jeffries, 21 F. 3d at 1242. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. This is akin to what Professor Martha Mahoney describes as “color evasion”: 
When whites are color evasive, they fail to notice their own color, the color 
of others, and any difference between them.  Color evasion treats noticing 
color or race as a manifestation of prejudice.  Although color evasion seems 
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McPherson exercised her free speech rights under the weight of an 
American discomfort with racial discourse in general and a White 
tendency to radicalize the speech and actions of Blacks, Jeffries was 
similarly handicapped because he is a Black racist. 
Derrick Bell’s allegorical work, Faces at the Bottom of the Well:  The 
Permanence of Racism,163 forcefully depicts the caldron that envelopes 
the Black speaker who breaches what Bell refers to as “the rules of 
racial standing.”  Bell gives definition to one of these rules by 
engaging in a dialogue with a fictional character named Geneva.  He 
asks, “It’s not set out in the Fourth Rule, Geneva, but have you 
noticed that those blacks who utter ‘beyond the pale’ remarks are 
never forgiven.”164  Citing the Reverend Jesse Jackson’s “Hymie and 
Hymietown” remarks from his 1984 presidential bid as well as 
remarks by the controversial Louis Farrakhan, Geneva responds: 
I understand why a group is upset by what it deems racial or 
religious insults, but I doubt that I’m alone in not understanding 
why blacks who lack any real power in society are not forgiven while 
whites, including those at the highest levels of power, are 
pardoned.  For example, many Jewish spokespeople complained 
bitterly when President Reagan went to lay a wreath at the Nazi 
cemetery at Bitburg in Germany, but they do not continue to 
harass him about the issue everywhere he goes.  No one denounced 
Reagan as anti-Semitic for going.  More significantly, neither 
President Bush nor the whites who support him are called on to 
condemn Reagan in order to prove that they are not anti-Semitic.165 
                                                          
to many white Americans like courtesy, the idea that noticing race is itself 
prejudiced rests on a fundamental sense that race involves the inferiority of 
the “Other.”  White privilege is the product of a social history of racial power 
and subordination.  Adopted in an effort to avoid being racist, color evasion 
implicitly preserves values drawn from essentialist racism. 
Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law:  Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 808–09 (2003). 
The notion of an equivalency between White racism and conduct such as 
Jeffries’s has been persuasively rejected: 
What is often referred to as “black racism” consists of judgments made about 
whites by some black leaders or commentators to the effect that “no white 
people can be trusted” or “the white man is the devil.”  But these critical 
ideas or negative prejudices are not the equivalent of modern white racism.  
The latter involves not just individual thoughts but also widely socialized 
ideologies and omnipresent practices based on entrenched racialized beliefs.  
The prejudices and myths used to justify antiblack actions are not invented 
by individual perpetrators, nor are they based only on personal experience.  
These patterns of highly racialized thought are embedded in the culture and 
institutions of a white-centered society. 
FEAGIN & VERA, supra note 107, at x. 
 163. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:  THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM (1992). 
 164. Id. at 121–22. 
 165. Id. at 122. 
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The meta-principle that one divines from the colloquy is that race 
talk in the United States is framed in a hierarchy, an ordering that is 
influenced by the race of the speaker, the object or subject of his 
speech, and the political power of those who are insulted by the 
speech.  This hierarchy, in turn, supplies Whites accused of racism 
with an arsenal of rhetorical devices to blunt the charge while 
reinforcing the accuser’s social inequality.  Sociolinguist Teun van 
Dijk discusses the common practice of denial and observes that 
“denials often lead to the strategic move of reversal:  Not we are the 
racists, they are the ‘true racists.’”166  The anti-racist speaker is recast as 
the racist in reversal.167  This move is facilitated by the social 
dominance of the group practicing reversal and the relative political 
weakness of the accuser.168 
In practical terms, it did not matter whether Jeffries was correct in 
his charge that New York school curricula were racially biased; his 
selection of language allowed critics to deploy the full panoply of 
denial techniques, including reversal.169  This has significant 
consequences for the perpetuation of societal discrimination.  The 
power not only to dismiss a problem as non-existent but to define the 
language with which the problem must be discussed is the ultimate 
power of evasion.  Moreover, the charge of racism or anti-Semitism 
against an African American has a potency that it lacks against a more 
powerful actor.170  If racism is a cause of one’s social inequality, 
indicting him with that very malevolence diffuses responsibility for his 
inequality.  The identity of the victims and perpetrators of racism 
becomes discursive, and the elusiveness of culpability sets a 
psychological, cultural, rhetorical, and even legal boundary against 
which the propriety of protest or outsider discourse is measured.171  In 
                                                          
 166. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 184.  Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva 
refers to this defense mechanism simply as “projection,” a rhetorical device used to 
“escape from guilt and responsibility and affix blame elsewhere.”  EDUARDO BONILLA-
SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:  COLOR-BLIND RACISM 63–64 (2d ed. 2006). 
 167. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 184. 
 168. See id. at 181 (“Denials challenge the very legitimacy of anti-racist analysis, 
and thus are part of the politics of ethnic management:  as long as a problem is being 
denied in the first place, the critics are ridiculed, marginalised or delegitimated:  
denials debilitate resistance.”). 
 169. For instance, the President of City College, Jeffries’s employer, condemned 
his remarks as “racist” and “anti-Semitic.”  Joseph Berger, College Chief Calls Jeffries 
‘Racist,’ But Defends Keeping Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at B1. 
 170. See infra notes 174–181 and accompanying text (recalling several instances of 
racism by politicians and others in the public eye and noting that the public is more 
tolerant of White racist behavior than controversial Black speech). 
 171. Cf. Elite Discourse, supra note 113, at 227 (discussing the diffusion of blame 
for racism in the Netherlands).  “[D]iscrimination is presented as a universal 
characteristic of humanity, which seems to make it as harmless as a traffic 
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the legal context, for instance, Justice Powell could rationalize his 
cabined view of permissible affirmative action by noting that: 
[T]he white “majority” itself is composed of various minority 
groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior 
discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.  
Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and 
corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of 
race and nationality, for then the only “majority” left would be a 
new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants.172 
Because of these boundaries and the capacious definition of 
“minority” that they accommodate, even a broad charge of 
discrimination, in contrast to Jeffries’s pointed accusations, may 
subject a Black speaker to the process of reversal.173 
The process of reversal marginalizes the Black speaker in a way that 
comparable charges of racism against a White do not.  From their 
support of Ronald Reagan, despite their belief that his policies 
harmed Blacks,174 to the re-ascension of Senator Trent Lott after his 
public embrace of segregation,175 White Americans have 
                                                          
misdemeanor, while at the same time defusing the special role of white Europeans in 
racism.”  Id. at 227. 
 172. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295–96 (Powell, J.) (1978) 
(plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court).  More recently, Justice 
Stevens has harshly criticized this type of rhetorical maneuver by the Supreme 
Court’s conservative majority in rolling back the goals of primary and secondary 
school integration: 
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  The first sentence in the 
concluding paragraph of his opinion states:  “Before Brown, schoolchildren 
were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of 
their skin . . . .”  This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation:  
“[T]he majestic equality of the la[w] forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep 
under bridges, to beg in the street, and to steal their bread.”  THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so 
ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children 
struggling to attend black schools. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 173. See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-
Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853, 856–57 (1995) (because Jews and Asian Americans are 
“traditionally oppressed groups,” disproportionately represented in economic and 
educational elites, denominating the concept of merit as a social construct intended 
to perpetuate the power of dominant groups, as critical race theorists have done, 
implies negative and anti-Semitic views about these groups’ success). 
 174. See supra notes 77–83 (asserting that Reagan’s policies were hostile towards 
Blacks but were largely embraced by the electorate). 
 175. Lott was forced to step down as Senate Majority Leader after remarking that 
if America had elected Senator Strom Thurmond as President in 1948, it “wouldn’t 
have had all these problems.”  Charles Babington, Lott Rejoins Senate Leadership:  In 
Comeback Mississippian Is Elected GOP Whip over Alexander, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2006, 
at A4.  Thurmond had run on a segregationist platform in 1948.  Id.  Four years after 
Lott’s resignation, the Republican caucus elected Lott Minority Whip, the party’s 
 562 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:523 
demonstrated a leniency toward anti-Black dispositions that has no 
parallel in their processing of controversial speech by Blacks.176  Thus, 
the condemnation of Louis Farrakhan and one of his lieutenants, 
Khallid Abdul Muhammad, for alleged anti-Semitic remarks was such 
a cause célèbre that none other than Congress itself intervened to 
censure them.177  Yet no censure was in order for a United States 
Senator’s public embrace of segregation.178  A venerated civil rights 
leader, Andrew Young, was roundly criticized not for the inaccuracy 
of his statements about groups that have exploited Blacks 
economically but rather for having the temerity to make these 
observations publicly.179  Meanwhile, the publication of scholarship 
                                                          
second-highest post in the Senate.  Id.  “Lott’s feat ranks among the more impressive 
political comebacks of recent times.”  Id. 
 176. The (temporary) demise of White shock-jock Don Imus does not belie this 
point.  Despite an American preoccupation with celebrity that borders on frivolity, 
Imus’s on-air racial insult of the Black women of a college basketball team does not 
compare to the direct, tangible harm inflicted by the policies of President Reagan or 
Trent Lott.  Indeed, the danger in allowing Whites to assuage their collective racial 
conscience by condemning racial insult is that “we’re reinforcing this notion that 
[racial insult is] all that racism is.”  David Alexander, Imus Firing Should Not End Race 
Debate:  Experts, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUS 
N1344138620070413?pageNumber=3&sp=true (quoting Darren Hutchinson, 
Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law). 
 177. See Clarence Page, Doing the ‘White’ Thing on Capitol Hill, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 
1999, at 19 (noting the congressional vote to censure Farrakhan).  Muhammad was 
censured by the United States House of Representatives and Senate for a 1993 
speech in which he referred to Jews as “bloodsuckers.”  Jayson Blair, K.A. Muhammad, 
53, Dies; Ex-Official of Nation of Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at 40. 
 178. Senator Carl Levin of Michigan introduced the motion to censure Louis 
Farrakhan in the United States Senate.  When asked whether he would introduce a 
censure motion against Lott, he declined to do so unless it was done on a bipartisan 
basis.  Senators Rick Santorum and Carl Levin Discuss Iraq, the War on Terrorism, Trent 
Lott, and the New Bush Economic Team, NBC News Transcripts, Meet the Press, Dec. 15, 
2002.  Levin, a Democrat, would not even call for Lott to step down as Senate 
Majority Leader.  Id.  His reticence to condemn White racism with the same vigor as 
Black speech is not atypical.  White Americans at times display a pathological craving 
for inverting the prototype of American racism by purporting to demonstrate that 
Blacks, too, are racists.  Consider that nearly twenty years after Jesse Jackson’s 
infamous “Hymietown” remark, the Boston City Council passed a resolution 
condemning his use of the term.  Scott S. Greenberger & Alice Gomstyn, Resolved:  
That Councilors Never Forget, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2002, at B1.  In juxtaposition to 
this manic vigilance of Black speech, consider the Louisiana State Republican Party 
Committee’s refusal to censure state Representative David Duke for his past 
leadership of the Ku Klux Klan.  Louisiana GOP Won’t Censure Duke, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 1989, at 24.  Whites’ psychological need to project their racism onto Black victims 
has become so absurd that the eighty-year-old namesake of the only law school in 
Rhode Island recently blamed his use of the term “nigger” during a university 
trustees meeting on rap music.  See Associated Press, R.I. School Official Resigns After 
Slur, WashingtonPost.com, July 16, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/c 
ontent/article/2007/07/16/AR2007071600808_pf.html (quoting Ralph Papitto’s 
explanation of his use of the term:  “The first time I heard it was on television and 
then rap music or something”). 
 179. See, e.g., Cynthia Tucker, Opinion, Stereotypes Fester—Thanks Even to Young, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 27, 2006, at A6.  Along with many other editorial-page 
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proposing that Black applicants not be admitted to elite law schools 
has been feted as worthy of intellectual exploration.180  The 
boundaries for legitimate discourse are different for speakers of 
different races, depending on the race and social positions of those 
about whom they speak and of those evaluating the speech.  As one 
commentator lamented after observing the nation’s preoccupation 
with Farrakhan’s speeches as compared with its laxity toward White 
neo-Nazi militia groups associated with the Oklahoma City bombings, 
“it is far easier for Americans to censure blacks than whites, even 
when the infractions are of different orders of magnitude.”181 
The attempt here, as it has been in all the narratives used, is not to 
justify Jeffries’s incipient speech, but rather to demonstrate that his 
social inequality as a racial minority and the social dominance of 
those evaluating his speech likely interacted to distort the discourse.  
Whether current First Amendment doctrine accounts for the 
operation of and attempts to neutralize these social inequities is the 
next inquiry. 
                                                          
editors, Tucker criticized Young for defending Wal-Mart’s practice of driving 
neighborhood shops out of business.  Young argued that many of these shops 
provided poor services to Black communities and observed:  “Those are the people 
who have been overcharging us—selling us stale bread and bad meat and wilted 
vegetables. . . . I think they’ve ripped off our communities enough.  First it was Jews, 
then it was Koreans, and now it’s Arabs.  Very few blacks own these stores.”  Id.  
Without any factual refutation of Young’s assertions, Tucker, who is Black, reflexively 
decried his comments as “bigotry.”  Id. 
I addressed rhetorical moves like Tucker’s in my own editorial concerning 
Young’s comments: 
There’s a familiar pattern here.  A black public figure criticizes a particular 
ethnic group such as Jews, and his sin of specification, rather than the 
substance of his charge, becomes the focus of public attention.  It’s the racial 
equivalent of wag the dog, a perfect deflection of the public’s attention from 
the real, more serious issue.  And a black public official is the perfect foil 
because his perceived gaffe dilutes the moral legacy of black people as 
victims of exploitation by virtually every ethnic group in the United States, 
including Jews, Koreans and Arabs. 
Posting of Terry Smith to Blackprof.com, Andy Young’s Truth, America’s Blues, 
http://www.blackprof.com/?p=1588 (Aug. 20, 2006). 
 180. See Adam Litak, For Blacks in Law School, Can Less Be More?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2005, at 3 (reporting on a study by Professor Richard Sander that purported to 
demonstrate that admitting Black students to less prestigious law schools, rather than 
elite ones, would increase the number of Black lawyers).  Blacks are all too common 
fodder for studies like that authored by Sander, which, to be sure, may rely on data 
but also on “inference and speculation.”  Id.  And unlike the flight from substance 
and knee-jerk condemnations provoked by controversial speech from Blacks, 
Sander’s work has been engaged on its own terms.  See id.  (“His critics generally 
accept, and sometimes even praise, aspects of his empirical work.”). 
 181. Nell Irvin Painter, Editorial, Hate Speech in Black and White, BALT. SUN, May 8, 
1995, at 9A. 
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II. ACCOUNTING FOR INEQUALITY:  THE LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT 
DOCTRINE 
The interaction of social inequality with free speech rights is a 
vexing concern that neither courts nor academics have quelled.  
Owing to the First Amendment’s strongly individualist tradition and 
equal protection’s countervailing pedigree of concern for group 
subordination, the jurisprudence outside the employment context 
has been bifurcated with little mutual accommodation.182  But the 
tension between equality and expression engaged by the scholarship 
of Professor Nan Hunter and others183 is one that is only partially 
permutated in the public employment context.  For one thing, the 
requirement that an employee’s speech be on a matter of public 
concern, and the reduced protection for speech that primarily 
implicates the employee’s idiosyncratic interests, dilutes the 
individual-versus-group dichotomy that underpins the broader First 
Amendment debate.  Under the Pickering/Connick construct, in order 
to receive protection, the employee becomes a de facto spokesman 
for other individuals in the community or workplace who share his 
point of view.  Nonetheless, the critical insight contributed by this 
body of scholarship is a need for an identity-sensitive First 
Amendment jurisprudence, in which the social inequality of the 
speaker is incorporated into the analysis rather than ignored. 
Outside the employment context, the goals of social equality and 
free expression have clashed where one group has attempted to 
exclude another from its activities because it objects to the excluded 
group’s viewpoint.  Hunter uses as a paradigm Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,184 in which parade organizers 
were permitted to exclude pro-homosexual advocates.185  While 
Hunter’s frame of reference (i.e., one organization excluding 
members of another) is factually distinguishable from the 
employment setting, the conceptual underpinning of her argument is 
                                                          
 182. See Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum:  Toward Anti-
orthodoxy and Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1686 (2000) (“Individualism supplied 
the cultural meaning of the First Amendment and became indelibly associated with 
the nation’s keystone freedom.”); id. at 1690 (“By contrast to the mobility intrinsic to 
the jurisprudence of expression, the jurisprudence of equality has grown into a 
dependence on the fixity of identity, a doctrinal form of immobility.”). 
 183. Id. at 1712 (citing Steven Shiffrin, The Amendment and the Meaning of America, 
in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 307 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1995)). 
 184. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 185. Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity:  Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000). 
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germane:  “[S]peech performs identity.”186  That is, social identity for 
certain sub-populations is constructed through their dissent from the 
mainstream, or as Hunter puts it, from a unique “point of 
view(ing) . . . .”187  The imbricate stories relayed in Part I demonstrate 
how the dissenting speech of the minority actor contributes to 
disadvantageous perceptions of him, particularly when the speech is 
oppositional to racism or a prevailing societal ukase that reflects 
racial divides.  Hunter strives to create a conceptual framework for 
accommodating equality and speech claims.188  The backdrop for the 
discourse in the employment context, however, is a more 
rudimentary argument about which level of scrutiny employee free 
speech claims are entitled to.  In the sections that follow, I first 
discuss the courts’ general refusal to apply strict scrutiny to free 
speech claims by public sector employees, underscoring the especial 
disadvantage that this practice poses for minority plaintiffs whose 
speech is referential to their social inequality.  I then discuss the 
limited and inadequate role that courts have permitted equal 
protection to play in public employee speech cases and why equal 
protection doctrine is unlikely to fill the First Amendment’s void in 
protecting socially unequal speakers such as racial minorities.  Finally, 
I revisit in some detail the rationale of the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which the Court further eroded the 
protections available to public employee free speech and thus 
reduced the First Amendment’s ability to neutralize social inequality 
among speakers. 
A. Mapping the Doctrinal Present:  Avoiding Strict Scrutiny 
Courts generally do not apply strict scrutiny to the content-based 
restrictions placed on employee speech by government employers.189  
                                                          
 186. Id. at 11. 
 187. Id. at 12.  Hunter writes: 
Expressive identity theory envisions expression and equality as a continuum, 
rather than a dichotomy.  It embodies two components that can never be 
fully disaggregated.  As a result, identity becomes less fixed, less easy to 
define, classify, or contain, a development that could reinvigorate equal 
protection jurisprudence.  A theory of expressive identity differs from 
identity politics because this unruliness arises not solely from the concept of 
difference, but also from that of dissent.  Expressive identity marks the 
juncture where equality claims can successfully incorporate point-of-
view(ing) rationales.  Theorizing expressive identity seeks to recuperate 
dissent for equality. 
Id. 
 188. See id. at 20 (proposing a three-step doctrinal inquiry). 
 189. John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1141–42 (2005); see 
Alexandra Gruber & Barbara Kritchevsky, The Uneasy Coexistence of Equal Protection and 
Free Speech Claims in the Public Employment Context, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 559, 587–88 
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The variegated intermediate-level scrutiny courts do apply results in 
upholding speech restrictions on government workers “for reasons 
that would not suffice if the same restrictions were imposed on 
others.”190  The level of constitutional scrutiny almost certainly affects 
the courts’ ability to account for the social inequality of an employee 
penalized for his speech.191 
Lower courts seldom explicate the jurisprudential reasons for the 
application of intermediate scrutiny; they simply note that the 
Supreme Court’s Pickering/Connick balancing test amounts to 
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny.192  The Supreme Court, 
however, has made clear its twin concerns that the government 
employer not be prevented from running an efficient shop193 and, 
concomitantly, that government employees not enjoy free speech 
                                                          
(2001) (noting that public employee speech receives “far less First Amendment 
protection than the average citizen”). 
 190. Fee, supra note 189, at 1141–42; United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (“Congress may impose restraints on the job-related 
speech of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the 
public at large.”). 
 191. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(explicitly rejecting strict scrutiny and instead applying Pickering/Connick balancing 
to government applicant’s claim that the withdrawal of her job offer as a staff 
attorney in the Georgia Attorney General’s office was based on her lesbian 
“marriage” and that such action violated her First Amendment associational rights).  
The Eleventh Circuit credited the State Attorney General’s concerns over the 
public’s perception of a state lawyer symbolically defying Georgia’s non-recognition 
of same-sex marriages and the possible conflicts of interest that the plaintiff may have 
in gay rights cases, such as those banning sodomy, in which Georgia had already 
been and was likely to again be a defendant.  Id. at 1104–07.  Georgia had, for 
instance, been the defendant in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overturned by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).  The circuit court concluded that the 
attorney general’s concerns outweighed the plaintiff’s associational interests.  Id. at 
1110. 
 192. E.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1037 (6th Cir. 2003); Shahar, 114 F.3d 
at 1102–03; see also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 3803 v. Kan. City, 220 F.3d 
969, 973–74 (8th Cir. 2000) (adapting Pickering/Connick intermediate scrutiny to a 
public employee’s First Amendment associational claim). 
Even where courts have attempted to provide a rationale for applying 
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, their logic has amounted to little more than 
a tautology.  For instance, in Kansas City, the court rejected the application of strict 
scrutiny because of the “distinction between Kansas City’s role as a sovereign and the 
government’s role as an employer.”  220 F.3d at 973.  Although the government’s 
differing roles might give rise to different interests to be weighed, it does not explain 
why a lesser constitutional standard should be applied to those interests.  See Knight 
v. Conn. Dep’t of Publ. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (providing a 
similarly circular rationale for the application of intermediate scrutiny to a hybrid 
speech-association claim). 
 193. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (“The government’s interest 
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a 
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it 
acts as employer.”). 
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rights incongruous with private sector employees where the former’s 
speech does not implicate matters of public concern.194 
Recent critiques of heightened scrutiny by legal scholars raise 
concerns about its salutary nature.195  Yet strict scrutiny’s potency is 
relative and can only be appreciated in relation to lesser standards of 
review, in this instance Pickering/Connick balancing.  One can 
plausibly imagine a different outcome for Professor Leonard Jeffries 
had this nebulous balancing test been replaced by strict scrutiny’s 
requirement that the government demonstrate a narrowly tailored 
compelling interest before disciplining Jeffries for his speech by 
demoting him as chair of the Black Studies Department at the City 
University of New York (“CUNY”).196  Instead, the Second Circuit, 
interpreting Supreme Court precedent, held that the university need 
not show the actual disruptiveness of Jeffries’s speech; it was sufficient 
under Pickering/Connick balancing that the government “make a 
substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive.”197  
This standard allowed the university to speculate about the 
harmfulness of Jeffries’s speech without confronting how the relative 
social inequality of Jeffries vis-à-vis his critics may have infected any 
assessment of disruption.198  Strict scrutiny would have required the 
university to move beyond hypothetical concerns.199  The more 
demanding evidentiary predicate would not have required “an 
employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption 
of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest 
before taking action,”200 for the exigent circumstances necessitating 
                                                          
 194. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“Our responsibility is to 
ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for 
the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances 
not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the State.”). 
 195. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened 
Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1534 (2004) (arguing that “heightened scrutiny” of 
classifications based on sexual orientation—a regimen effectuated by Lawrence v. 
Texas,  123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)—will paradoxically lead to greater governmental 
scrutiny of gay conduct); Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional 
Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 209–11 (2005) (using historical examples to 
illustrate that “strict scrutiny may be susceptible to skewing effects or manipulation in 
times of crisis”). 
 196. Jeffries v. Harleson, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 197. Id. at 13 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994)).  Waters held that 
the speech for which a public employer disciplines an employee need not be the 
employee’s actual speech so long as the employer reasonably concludes that the 
employee made the remarks at issue.  511 U.S. at 667. 
 198. See infra notes 233–248 and accompanying text (prescribing a framework for 
detecting the effect of social inequality). 
 199. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to 
Georgia’s allegedly race-based redistricting plan and requiring a “strong basis in 
evidence” that the plan was necessary to cure the effects of past discrimination). 
 200. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
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prompt action by the government is one factor to be taken account of 
in determining whether it possesses a compelling interest.201  In 
Jeffries’s circumstances in particular, because Jeffries remained a 
tenured professor and because “the position of department chair at 
CUNY is ministerial, and provides no greater public contact than an 
ordinary professorship,”202 strict scrutiny would not have undermined 
the Supreme Court’s purported concerns with efficiency and 
workplace stability.  What strict scrutiny would have likely achieved, 
however, is a more probing inquiry into the university’s claims of 
disruption and, ultimately, a different result. 
Whatever the deficiencies of strict scrutiny review, they pale in 
comparison to the vagaries and lopsidedness of Pickering/Connick 
balancing.  Cases such as Jeffries suggest that in order to neutralize the 
social inequality of the speaker in assessing the constitutional 
protection his speech is due, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
must elevate the First Amendment standard for all public employee 
speech.  To the extent that the current jurisprudence is lacking 
generally, it may disproportionately vitiate protection for the speech 
of racial minorities when these employees’ speech violates White-
sanctioned workplace norms. 
B. Mapping the Doctrinal Present:  The Limitations of Equal Protection 
Because strict scrutiny will not generally be applied to public 
employees’ First Amendment free speech claims, employees have re-
articulated such claims under the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The objective of this relocation 
is to obtain under the fundamental rights prong of equal protection 
what Pickering/Connick balancing denies them:  strict scrutiny.203  
Where the equal protection claim is predicated on the public 
employee’s exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights, courts 
have generally rejected the claim as repetitive of the free speech 
claim.204  Thus, in the archetypal public employee free speech case in 
                                                          
 201. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972) (permitting the government to 
abrogate the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before seizing private property where there is “a special need for very prompt 
action”). 
 202. Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 14. 
 203. Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 586–87. 
 204. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Starkville, Miss., 901 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir. 
1990) (determining that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim based 
on the exercise of his free speech rights where plaintiff cannot point to others who 
exercised such rights for purposes of determining unequal treatment).  Gruber and 
Kritchevsky conclude that the approach taken in these cases is correct: 
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which the claim of unequal treatment is undifferentiated from the 
free speech claim, the Equal Protection Clause has demonstrated no 
greater capacity to neutralize the social inequality of the speaker than 
has the First Amendment. 
The variations on the uses of equal protection in conjunction with 
free speech claims present ameliorative possibilities that are more 
theoretical than real.  Each of the public employees in the narratives 
of Part I, for instance, could claim classification or status 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause based on his or her 
race or nationality.205  But race-based status discrimination claims 
suffer a quite low rate of success.206  Where speech and listeners’ 
reactions thereto are proxies for race—as they are in the foregoing 
narratives—the very subtlety of the interaction of speech and race 
frustrates, if not dooms, an already disadvantaged status claim. 
Rather than relying on his status, a speaker could allege content or 
viewpoint discrimination—that is, he could allege that an employer 
punished him for his speech on a particular subject or for advocating 
                                                          
The situation is different . . . when the plaintiff claims that the only basis on 
which he was treated differently was his exercise of First Amendment rights.  
Most lower courts have properly found that plaintiffs in these cases do not 
state equal protection claims.  This result is correct because the plaintiff’s 
allegation in these cases is simply that the employer erred in treating him 
differently from other employees because he exercised his right to speak.  
The question is whether the employer had the right to treat him differently 
for speaking.  That is the precise question for which the Court developed the 
Pickering-Connick analysis. 
Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 601 (footnotes omitted). 
Even where lower courts have recognized an equal protection claim predicated 
on an employee’s exercise of his free speech rights, they have eschewed the use of 
strict scrutiny out of similar overlap concerns as those courts that have refused to 
recognize the equal protection claim.  See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of 
Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding the employee’s equal protection 
claim based on the exercise of his free speech but declining to use fundamental 
rights analysis, which would apply strict scrutiny, because plaintiff constituted only a 
class of one).  While the Scarbrough court recognized the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000), that equal protection claims 
can be brought by a class of one, it declined to apply Olech to fundamental rights 
analysis because to do so “would allow the Equal Protection Clause to render other 
constitutional provisions superfluous.”  470 F.3d at 261. 
 205. See Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 594 (“[T]he lower courts have 
consistently allowed public employees to state claims that invoke the classification 
strand of equal protection law, claims in which employees allege that they were 
discriminated against based on class membership, in addition to First Amendment 
claims.”). 
 206. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558–60 (2001) (citing statistics and noting that “plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination suits generally fare worse than most other kinds of civil 
plaintiffs”); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:  Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 912 (2005) (“The state of employment discrimination 
practice can be easily summarized:  plaintiffs are losing almost all of the cases they 
file except for a few isolated ones, most notably sexual harassment claims.”). 
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a particular viewpoint but did not discipline others who similarly 
exercised their First Amendment rights.207  Although non-
employment cases such as R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul208 establish that 
governmental favoritism in the proscription of speech that the 
government is otherwise entitled to prohibit will be subject to strict 
scrutiny,209 the public sector employee faces two immediate difficulties 
in pursuing an equal protection claim on this basis.  First, the claim 
requires a comparator.  The employee who merely claims that he was 
punished for exercising his First Amendment rights while those who 
did not speak were spared discipline must rely on the 
Pickering/Connick test, which provides a reduced standard of judicial 
review.210  Moreover, the equal protection claimant must show that he 
was “similarly situated” to those who did exercise their rights and 
were not disciplined.  Within a White-dominated workplace that 
tacitly incorporates societal norms, these criteria are problematic.  
Two commentators provide an example through which the 
complications can be explored.  According to Alexandra Gruber and 
Barbara Kritchevsky, “an employee who speaks of ‘black power’ and 
an employee who speaks of ‘white power’ would be similarly situated, 
even if the ‘white power’ expression had more of a disruptive effect 
on the work environment.”211  A preference by an employer for either 
viewpoint should receive strict scrutiny.212 
Yet things are not so simple in the economy of racialization in the 
workplace.  First, racial identity is a defining characteristic in most 
African Americans’ lives in a manner that it is not in the lives of 
White Americans precisely because, as the socially dominant group, 
                                                          
 207. See Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 598–99 (listing cases where 
alleged viewpoint discrimination occurred).  “Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an 
egregious form of content discrimination,” the latter being directed at the subject 
matter of the speech, the former at the particular view taken on a subject.  
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995). 
 208. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 209. See id. at 395–96 (applying strict scrutiny to a hate-crimes ordinance that 
singled out certain fighting words—i.e., speech expressing racial hostility—but 
permitted other expressions that the government was likewise capable of 
proscribing—i.e., the expression of hostility on the basis of homosexuality). 
 210. See Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 601 (noting that lower courts 
have denied the equal protection claim and applied Pickering/Connick balancing to 
these circumstances because “[t]he question [in the equal protection claim] is 
whether the employer had the right to treat him differently for speaking.  That is the 
precise question for which the Court developed the Pickering-Connick analysis.”).  But 
see Kantha v. Blue, 262 F. Supp. 2d 90, 107–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (suggesting that a 
speech-based equal protection claim might survive where plaintiff can show that 
similarly situated employees “who did not complain about Blue’s conduct, were 
treated differently” from her). 
 211. Gruber & Kritchevsky, supra note 189, at 609. 
 212. Id. at 610. 
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Whites “have the option to set aside consciousness of the 
characteristic that defines the dominant class—in this case, race.”213  
Despite their consciousness of race and its centrality to their identity, 
in a culture of White meta-privilege,214 people of color necessarily 
engage in self-censorship in their discussions with Whites.  African 
Americans are more likely to engage each other in discussions about 
Whites and racism and are more likely to restrict discussions with 
Whites to more pedestrian topics.215  These dynamics curtail the 
efficacy of content or viewpoint discrimination claims because, first, 
people of color do not as a practical matter enjoy the same 
opportunity of expression as Whites in a White-dominated workplace; 
and second, the search for comparators for a minority employee who 
does engage in identity speech will likely be hampered by the 
reduced need of Whites to engage in such speech. 
A minority employee’s content or viewpoint discrimination claim is 
further complicated by judicial vagaries in determining who is a 
similarly situated employee216 and by an apparent insistence on a 
showing of intentional conduct, even when the employee is not 
complaining of status-based or class-based discrimination.  The 
Second Circuit’s articulation of the applicable standards is illustrative 
of both these hurdles: 
In establishing the similarly-situated element, we have warned that 
“the level of similarity between plaintiffs and the person with whom 
they compare themselves must be extremely high.”  A plaintiff must 
show that (1) “no rational person could regard the circumstances 
of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree 
that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a 
legitimate government policy; and [(2)] the similarity in 
circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude 
the possibility that the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.”217 
                                                          
 213. Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective 
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2035 (1995). 
 214. See Barbara J. Flagg, Foreward:  Whiteness as Metaprivilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) (defining Whiteness as an ultimate privilege because “Whiteness 
sets the terms on which racial identity is constructed”). 
 215. HECHT ET AL., supra note 104, at 110. 
 216. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 636 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To 
prove discriminatory effect, the plaintiffs are required to show that they are members 
of a protected class, that they are otherwise similarly situated to members of the 
unprotected class, and that plaintiffs were treated differently from members of the 
unprotected class.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 217. Skehan v. The Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal 
citations omitted); see Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 445 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 
2006) (requiring that an equal protection plaintiff show selective treatment with an 
“intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights”) (internal citation 
omitted); Morron v. City of Middletown, 464 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D. Conn. 2006) 
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Judicial insistence on exacting verisimilitude between speech 
comparators undermines the salutary effect of escaping the strictures 
of the Pickering/Connick test.  Moreover, the indirect requirement of 
an intent to harm—as expressed by the allowance of a mistake 
defense—ignores prevailing social science that demonstrates that 
bias, whether against status or speech, need not be motivational but 
instead often arises from unconscious cognitive processes.218  Thus, 
while content or viewpoint discrimination is perhaps the best 
judicially recognized means of accounting for inequality in workplace 
speech, it is far from sufficient. 
C. Mapping the Doctrinal Present:  Garcetti’s Invitation to Discrimination 
Garcetti v. Ceballos219 further etiolates a First Amendment employee 
jurisprudence in which all employees may have too little protection 
but where this insufficiency abets racial inequality in the workplace, 
affording the minority employee still less protection.  Imagine that 
Ceballos, described in Part I as a conscientious public servant rather 
than a racial meliorist, did engage in identity politics.  That is, he 
brought to bear in a relevant fashion his cultural perspective on a 
work issue—here, the question of a sheriff deputy’s dishonesty in 
submitting an affidavit.  Because Garcetti categorically permits 
employer sanction of speech made pursuant to an employee’s official 
job duties, Ceballos’s culturally imbued perspective on the question 
of the sheriff deputy’s dishonesty can now be pretextually 
discriminated against with impunity.  A savvy public employer, of 
course, would not announce the biases that inform its sanction of 
Ceballos’s speech, nor for that matter need the employer even be 
cognizant of its biases.  Under such circumstances, equal protection 
doctrine is highly unlikely to pick up the First Amendment’s slack.  
The per se approach of Garcetti encourages unremediable content 
discrimination, discrimination that amounts to racial discrimination 
where the disciplined minority employee has intertwined his racial 
inequality with his speech. 
                                                          
(“[P]laintiff cannot prevail absent prima facie showing that he is identical in all 
relevant respects to the individuals with whom he compares himself.”); Cooper v. 
Smith, 855 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (dismissing an equal protection claim 
on narrow construction of similarly situated requirement because the plaintiff could 
not point to “other employees [who] publicly expressed distaste for their jobs and 
their superiors”). 
 218. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text (explaining that a person may 
be completely unaware that he is stereotyping a coworker or an event). 
 219. 126 S. Ct. 1955 (2006). 
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Garcetti’s per se approach is justifiable from neither a practical nor 
a constitutional standpoint.  The twenty-first century has ushered in 
the most diverse workforce in United States history.  With work as the 
most significant sphere of interracial and inter-cultural exchange,220 
its potential as an agent for distancing the nation from its 
discriminatory past is considerable.221  Yet scholars of organizational 
behavior caution that workplace diversity can brew dysfunctionality 
and conflict where employers and workers conceive diversity in 
homogenizing rather than operationally pluralistic terms.  Professor 
David A. Thomas of the Harvard Business School and Professor Robin 
Ely studied the interactions of workers and management in three 
racially diverse work settings, but found that the productivity and 
harmony of the groups varied with their conception of diversity: 
When a work group views cultural differences among its members 
as an important resource for learning how best to accomplish its 
core work, group members can negotiate expectations, norms, and 
assumptions about work in service of their goals, and conflicts that 
arise are settled by a process of joint inquiry. . . . In work groups in 
which it is legitimate for group members to bring all of their 
relevant knowledge and experience to bear on the core work of the 
group—including knowledge and experience linked to their 
cultural identity—members are more likely to feel valued and 
respected in the group and to receive more validation for their 
cultural self-identities. . . . This heightens group members’ feelings 
of effectiveness . . . and motivation to achieve. . . . By contrast, when 
a work group views cultural differences as having the potential to 
make only a marginal or negative contribution to work, the 
dominant cultural group likely defines prevailing expectations, 
norms, and assumptions about work, and conflicts, if not 
suppressed, are settled by power. . . . This impedes learning and 
limits members’ sense of self- and group efficacy.222 
Thus, for all of its professed concerns with efficiency in the 
government workplace, the Court in Garcetti fails to grapple with the 
workplace of the twenty-first century, in which dissent must be 
managed as an integral and healthy by-product of diversity in order 
for racially heterogeneous workplaces to prosper.  There is far less 
                                                          
 220. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:  HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 3 (2003) (“[O]f all the places where adults 
interact with others, the workplace is likely to be the most demographically 
diverse.”). 
 221. See id. at 11 (“A significant body of empirical research on intergroup relations 
confirms that cooperative interaction of the sort that often happens at work tends to 
produce more positive attitudes and relations across ethnic and racial lines.”). 
 222. David A. Thomas & Robin Ely, Cultural Diversity at Work:  The Effects of Diversity 
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 266–67 (2001). 
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incentive for the government employer to engage in best 
management practices, however, where the Court has licensed it to 
cleanse the workplace of divergent viewpoints when they are 
expressed as part of the employee’s formal duties.  Although a private 
employer might eschew such a heavy-handed approach for fear of the 
inefficiencies it may create, “a public employer, unlike his private 
counterpart, is not guided by the profit motive and constrained by 
the normal operation of the market.”223 
The majority in Garcetti attempted to leaven the harshness of its 
rule by suggesting that employers will voluntarily encourage the kind 
of exchanges that its decision makes punishable and by pointing to 
other statutory protections for employees, such as federal and state 
whistle-blower laws.224  This maneuver, however, only underscored the 
constitutionally antiquated nature of the majority’s rule.  Whistle-
blower statutes evince an emerging societal consensus that speech 
such as Ceballos’s that seeks to expose governmental malfeasance 
should be protected.  The Court has recognized the relevance of 
society’s “emerging awareness” and “emerging recognition” of the 
contours of constitutional liberty in its substantive due process 
cases.225  Although it has applied a different analysis to cases asserting 
an infraction of a liberty that is enumerated in the Bill of Rights,226 
the Court has not analyzed such rights wholly without reference to 
social understandings.227  For instance, in determining whether a 
public employer was justified in searching the office of an employee, 
the Court has asked as a threshold inquiry whether the employee has 
“an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable.”228 
                                                          
 223. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227 (1977) (discussing 
private sector/public sector difference in the context of collective bargaining 
agreement agency shop arrangements). 
 224. 126 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 225. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (asserting that people are to 
be afforded substantial protection in matters pertaining to sex). 
 226. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (distinguishing the right of intimate association protected by substantive 
due process from the right of expressive association protected by the First 
Amendment); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(demarcating the broad concept of liberty encompassed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause from specific rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights); Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 1521 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing 
between substantive due process analysis and violations of the Bill of Rights). 
 227. See generally James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Democracy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 7 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is in 
essential respects the “mirror image[]” of its substantive due process analysis). 
 228. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987). 
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Different enumerated rights may require a different weighting of 
societal norms, especially where a counter-majoritarian liberty such as 
the First Amendment is invoked.  Nevertheless, given the 
considerable extent to which the Court in Garcetti focused on the 
government employer’s interests, it is not unreasonable to attempt to 
ascertain employees’ understandings of fair workplace speech 
parameters.  In a different parlance, what is the “psychological 
contract” between workers and employers regarding workplace 
speech?229  It is most unlikely that Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff in 
Garcetti, reasonably expected to be subject to discipline for exposing 
potential mendacity by a deputy sheriff.  Most workers feel at liberty 
to express views that differ from their employer’s on even a highly 
controversial subject like the invasion of Iraq.230  Moreover, most do 
not believe the expression of such views will derogate productivity.231  
If workers expect that employers will act in good faith where the 
workplace speech is unrelated to the mission of the organization, 
they would indeed be surprised to find that speech “made pursuant 
to their official duties,” when not otherwise disruptive, was per se 
unprotected.232 
D. Summary:  Does the First Amendment Account for the Social Inequality of 
the Speaker? 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that while all public 
employee speech enjoys some protection under the First Amendment 
or a combination of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
                                                          
 229. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:  Implications 
of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 550 
(2001) (explaining that the psychological contract between the employee and 
employer includes their varying perceptions, beliefs, and interpretations with regard 
to workplace interaction). 
 230. See Work Life During Wartime:  Tensions, Anxiety, Risks of Discrimination Invade the 
Workplace, 21 HUMAN RESOURCES REPORT (BNA, INC.) 341, 341 (2003) (reporting the 
results of a survey conducted by the Employment Law Alliance which found that 89% 
of workers believed that they could express a view on the Iraq War that differed from 
their boss’). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship:  A Due Process Solution to 
a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 158 (2007) (suggesting a due 
process resolution to cases like Garcetti). 
When the government employer directs or encourages employees, as part of 
their job, to exercise and express their judgment or to disclose wrongdoing 
on matters of public concern, it implicitly promises them that they will not 
be subject to reprisals for doing so in a conscientious manner. . . . That 
implied contractual limitation on employer discretion should give rise to a 
limited property interest in employment and a right under the Due Process 
Clause to an impartial hearing . . . . 
Id. 
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Clause, these protections are overly porous.  When race is added as a 
differentiating characteristic among speakers, these protections 
become even more hollow because the courts’ inquiry into the 
workplace discourse is generally limited to intermediate rather than 
strict scrutiny.  This standard of constitutional review has obviously 
not prevented some public sector employees, both Black and White, 
from prevailing.  Ardith McPherson’s narrow triumph is testament to 
this.  Yet these successes do not speak to the cases that fall through 
the cracks, like Jeffries. 
The application of strict scrutiny would go far in addressing the 
interference of social inequality with the protection of workplace 
speech.  But advocating the application of strict scrutiny is mainly 
precatory.  Pickering/Connick balancing is well ingrained in the fabric 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, and the Court’s posture in 
Garcetti suggests an inclination to restrict rather than expand the First 
Amendment regimen.  The need to account for social inequalities 
among speakers must thus not only contend with, but ultimately 
dovetail with, these realities.  It is to this task that the final section of 
this Article now turns. 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR INEQUALITY INCREMENTALLY 
Garcetti v. Ceballos’s artificial distinction between speech made 
pursuant to an employee’s official duties and speech made as a 
citizen on the job increased the frailty of a free speech jurisprudence 
that already fails to adequately protect socially unequal speakers.  Yet 
in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,233 decided 
during the same term as Garcetti, the Court demonstrated an 
appreciation for the subtle ways in which speech can be suppressed 
and punished.  This understanding is germane to any effort to 
dissipate the effects of social inequality in the exercise of free speech.  
Although the First Amendment and Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision differ in reference to the right at issue, I contrast Garcetti 
and Burlington Northern below to illuminate the two very different 
views of workplace discourse that the Court harbored in the same 
term.  I then employ the broader teachings of Burlington Northern to 
re-litigate Garcetti. 
 
                                                          
 233. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
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A. Burlington Northern as a Superior Approach 
Like Ardith McPherson, Sheila White’s journey to the Supreme 
Court began as a result of her speech.  Unlike McPherson, White’s 
speech was about the discrimination she encountered as the lone 
female in her department.234  White, a Black woman who operated a 
forklift for a private employer, complained of harassment to her 
supervisor and filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.235  Each action was met 
punitively by agents of the defendant, Burlington Northern.236  As a 
result, White filed suit under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, 
which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII].”237 
Regardless of the differences between the sources of the rights, any 
protection of speech will raise common concerns.  Principal among 
these concerns are the chilling effects of employer actions on the 
exercise of the speech right.  Relatedly, free speech rights must be 
attuned to the dynamics of the range of interactions in which the 
protected speech may take place.  The Supreme Court in Burlington 
Northern was tasked with deciding which employer actions qualify as 
prohibited retaliation under Title VII,238 implicating both foregoing 
concerns.  In deciding that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
extended beyond so-called ultimate employment decisions such as 
terminations and pay cuts, the Court was cognizant of the subtleties 
that can characterize workplace discourse:  “The real social impact of 
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully 
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts 
performed.”239 
With this recognition in mind, the Court avoided the kind of 
categorical rule it announced in Garcetti, refusing to delineate specific 
prohibited retaliatory acts, and instead broadly holding that an act is 
retaliatory if “it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”240  The Court in 
Burlington Northern refused to eliminate whole categories of 
                                                          
 234. Id. at 2409. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 2411. 
 238. Id. at 2410. 
 239. Id. at 2415 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 
75, 81–82 (1998)). 
 240. Id. 
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potentially chilling employer actions because it recognized that 
context matters.  Yet in Garcetti, the Court may have eliminated from 
First Amendment protection entire categories of workplace speech 
made pursuant to an employee’s official duties without any regard for 
the context in which that speech occurs.  Garcetti’s approach, 
narrowly construed, calcifies the inadequacies of a First Amendment 
doctrine that perpetuates social inequalities in the workplace.  By 
contrast, Burlington Northern’s sensitivity to context, if transported into 
First Amendment jurisprudence, could offset not only Garcetti’s 
inattention to context but also some of the disadvantages of the 
courts’ general resistance to applying strict scrutiny to public 
employee speech.  To see how, let us re-litigate Garcetti, not under 
Burlington Northern’s rule—for it is understood that Burlington Northern 
was construing a specific statute—but rather using Burlington 
Northern’s approach, which is apropos across a range of speech 
protections. 
B. Re-litigating Garcetti 
Organizational behavior research confirms that workers do bring 
to bear their cultural backgrounds in the performance of their work 
duties.241  Richard Ceballos’s own account of his motives in 
questioning the veracity of a deputy sheriff suggests that workers may 
not always be aware of the impact of their own cultural background 
on their workplace conduct.  Recall that there are in essence two 
Ceballoses:  pre-conscience, in which his Latino heritage played no 
role in his decision, and post-conscience, in which the controversy 
and penalty ensuing from his decision caused Ceballos to become 
involved with a number of Latino legal organizations.242  The post-
conscience Ceballos poses particular challenges for courts attempting 
to apply the rule of Garcetti, for Ceballos, conscious of himself as a 
Latino American prosecutor, represents W.E.B. Du Bois’s classic duality 
of personhood for people of color:  they are at once members of 
                                                          
 241. See Thomas & Ely, supra note 222, at 257 (finding cultural identity to be a 
“significant factor” shaping the performance of study subjects’ job duties in 
employment settings that draw on employees’ cultural backgrounds as a source of 
knowledge and insight); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279–93 (2000) (discussing the costs to minorities of adopting 
workplace identities for the purpose of conforming to White workplace norms or 
disabusing Whites of minority stereotypes); Flagg, supra note 213, at 2011–16 
(illustrating through the now-famous example of “Keisha Akbar” how racial 
background is brought to bear on the work performance of Black Americans and 
proposing a Title VII remedy when employer policies discriminate against non-
assimilating minorities without business necessity for doing so). 
 242. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (describing the activist role 
taken by Ceballos as a Latino in the legal community). 
 2008] SPEAKING AGAINST NORMS 579 
their cultural groups, which imbue their lives with unique and 
indelible characteristics, and members of the broader American 
community.243  When the former is brought to bear in the execution 
of work duties, the minority American’s speech is indisputably speech 
as a citizen, even if the speech coincides with speech that the 
employee would otherwise make “pursuant to his employment 
duties.”244 
The challenge for courts, and the opportunity for plaintiffs, 
involves separating the duality that might accompany the workplace 
speech of a person of color or any other social unequal.  This is 
where Burlington Northern’s lessons about context can have 
consequential application in First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Obviously, if speech of the same nature as the speech that was subject 
to discipline takes place outside of work, the speech is not strictly 
speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties and is 
therefore not within the rule of Garcetti.245  But it is unlikely that most 
employees will have occasion to use public venues for speaking about 
work-related matters.  Save for a highly visible public venue or 
extraordinary efforts by an employer, it is equally unlikely that 
employees could prove that an employer was aware of speech on 
work-related matters that took place outside of work.  Thus, the 
prototype case involves the employee of color who speaks at work 
pursuant to his official duties in the same manner he would speak as a 
citizen.  In short, the prototype is an employee of color who practices 
                                                          
 243. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 5 (Gramercy Books 1994) 
(1903) (describing the African American state of being as a duality:  “One ever feels 
his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body. . . .”).  Commentators have adapted 
Du Bois’s classic construct to various other minority groups.  See, e.g., Jean Shin, The 
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 8 (2004) (“An analogous kind of dividedness 
may be observed in the case of Asian Americans—a division between the foreign 
Asian and the assimilable Asian American.”). 
 244. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1956 (2006); cf. Estlund, supra note 232, 
at 152 (“[I]nternal employee dissent often emerge[s] from a deeply personal sense 
of civic and moral obligation, not just the dutiful performance of the job one is paid 
for.”). 
 245. The speech would thus be subject to traditional Pickering/Connick balancing, 
unless its content placed it outside the parameters of public concern.  See City of San 
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (ruling that off-the-job speech subject to 
discipline is not entitled to balancing where speech exploits employer’s image but is 
not a topic of “legitimate news interest”). 
Ceballos made public statements about his controversy, specifically to the 
Mexican American Bar Association.  See First Amended Complaint, Ceballos v. 
Garcetti, No. 00-11106 (C.D. Ca. filed Sept. 24, 2001).  The Supreme Court 
remanded the case to determine whether these statements formed part of the basis 
for the actions against Ceballos.  Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.  The case was settled 
without judicial resolution of these claims.  Telephone Interview with Richard 
Ceballos, supra note 50. 
 580 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:523 
his duality in the workplace.  The narrowest reading of Garcetti would 
punish the exercise of this duality merely because it coincided with 
the employee’s official duties.  This constraint would have a uniquely 
burdensome impact on those employees most likely to voice norm-
violational speech in the workplace, including employees of color. 
Both Title VII and First Amendment jurisprudence have long 
recognized that employers sometimes act with mixed motives, proper 
and improper, in disciplining employees.246  The same duality of 
purpose that may motivate an employer can also account for an 
employee’s speech.  Unless lower courts must engage in an 
asymmetrical fiction in which employers can harbor mixed motives 
but employees cannot, a more salutary reading of Garcetti would 
permit an employee to demonstrate that the speech made pursuant 
to his official duties was also made with the intent of speaking as a 
citizen.  Burlington Northern helps to define the full evidentiary scope 
that should be available to an employee in meeting this burden.  
Under this reading of Garcetti, the post-conscience Ceballos’s 
founding of the Latino Prosecutors Association and his presidency of 
the National Hispanic Prosecutors Association would be evidence of 
an intent to speak beyond the dictates of his formal duties as a 
prosecutor, for these affiliations suggest that Ceballos seeks to bring 
to bear cultural viewpoints in the performance of his work.   
To the extent that the post-conscience Ceballos voices views on the 
job that are not in fulfillment of his official duties, but are 
nonetheless related to duties that may arise in the future, this, too, 
would be evidence of an intent to speak as a citizen.247  For instance, 
let us suppose that Ceballos in casual conversation opined on the 
facts of a case pending in a jurisdiction not his own.  Suppose further 
that those facts involved potential mendacity by a police affiant.  If, as 
a citizen, Ceballos expressed the same kind of skepticism about the 
hypothetical police affiant’s conduct that he ultimately expressed in 
his own case, the happenstance of being presented with similar facts 
in the fulfillment of his own duties should not force him to suppress 
                                                          
 246. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (determining that 
under Title VII, “[w]hen . . . an employer considers both gender and legitimate 
factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex and the 
other, legitimate factors”); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274, 287 (1977) (holding that the “District Court should have gone on to determine 
whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
reached the same decision as to respondent’s reemployment even in the absence of 
the protected conduct”). 
 247. Cf. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 (distinguishing between speech relevant to the 
subject matter of an employee’s job versus speech made pursuant to an employee’s 
official duties). 
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his views or place him at greater risk for punishment because now 
those views are expressed as part of his duties.  Instead, his prior 
expressions should be allowed as some evidence of an intent to speak 
as a citizen.248  When an employer in a mixed-motive case has 
demonstrated that it would have reached the same result even in the 
absence of the improper motive, it prevails, at least as to monetary 
damages.249  The public employee who demonstrates that his speech 
coincided with speech that he would ordinarily make as a citizen 
would not prevail in his case but rather would advance his case to the 
balancing stage of the Pickering/Connick test.250 
One consequence of the contextual application251 of Garcetti 
commended by Burlington Northern may be to encourage employees to 
engage in a more explicit brand of identity politics in the workplace 
                                                          
 248. The proposal I set forth here is superior to that of one commentator who has 
sought to demarcate the line for First Amendment protection based on where the 
speech is made, allowing employers broad latitude to punish on-the-job speech but 
treating the speech as that of a citizen when it is directed to the public.  Randy J. 
Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1044–45 (2005).  
First, Kozel’s prescription rests on the notion that “matters affecting the operations 
of public service-providers are potentially matters of public interest . . . [, and] 
encouraging employees to make their grievances public might well be desirable.”  Id. 
at 1045.  Whatever the desirability of a public airing of internal office matters, 
placing the onus of locating a public audience on the public employee as a condition 
of receiving constitutional protection is both unfair and awkward.  It is unfair 
because unless an employer has restricted workplace speech only to matters 
concerning work, much discussion that takes place in the workplace will resemble 
that which takes place outside the workplace, yet Kozel’s construct would leave such 
speech without protection.  As Kozel concedes, under his proposal, Ardith 
McPherson’s statements about President Ronald Reagan would likely be unprotected 
unless she carried them outside the office and into “the public discourse.”  Id. at 
1046.  Yet there was no policy in the Constable’s office prohibiting the private 
discussion of political matters, and the attempt to impose any such policy in a nation 
where the lines of work and private life blur out of practical necessity would be 
Orwellian.  See ESTLUND, supra note 220, at 119 (“Studies show that, when people are 
asked with whom they discuss matters of importance, including politics, co-workers 
figure as frequently as spouses, and more often than any other category of 
nonrelatives.”). 
 Most importantly, Kozel’s proposal has little relation to how people communicate 
in a multicultural workplace.  Workers bring to bear their cultural perspectives on 
their jobs, the very same perspectives that Kozel is apparently willing to protect as 
long as they are kept out of the workplace.  Kozel’s approach punishes those workers 
who are most likely to challenge workplace norms with their cultural perspectives.  
Any such outcome begs the question:  why should prevailing norms, and those 
willing to hew to them, be privileged in the workplace? 
 249. Under Title VII, an employer’s showing that it would have reached the same 
result limits the employee’s remedy to declaratory and injunctive relief and 
attorney’s fees and costs.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
 250. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 251. Cf. Smith, supra note 36, at 566 (proposing a contextual, self-defense model 
of opposition conduct under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision in which courts 
would ask:  “Would the totality of the employee’s experience with his employer cause 
a reasonable employee of the same race to behave in the same fashion?”). 
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in order to clearly demarcate speech as a citizen versus speech 
pursuant to employment duties.  A more pronounced identity politics 
in the workplace will in turn bring the First Amendment’s policing of 
social inequality into sharper relief.  An employee such as Ceballos 
would not be incentivized to downplay the racial dimension of his 
questioning the veracity of a White police officer’s affidavit.  Rather, 
statements that are shown to be part of a continuum of an employee’s 
authentic, independent race-consciousness would be insulated from 
Garcetti’s reach but would still be subject to discipline if shown to be 
unduly disruptive.252  This outcome is proper inasmuch as outspoken 
employees of color bear a risk of intersectional discrimination arising 
from both their status and speech that is referential to that status.253 
The broadening of the contextual inquiry for workplace speech 
sanctioned by Burlington Northern ameliorates not only the rule of 
Garcetti but also the broader overhang of intermediate scrutiny of 
employee workplace speech.  The “searching inquiry” of strict 
scrutiny may be unattainable by Burlington Northern’s proxy, but 
broadening the contextual inquiry will bring more precision to 
Pickering/Connick balancing.  For instance, Richard Ceballos’s 
attorneys did not pursue as a premise of their case the fact that his 
superiors were more likely to be aggrieved by his questioning the 
truthfulness of a police officer because one of them was married to 
                                                          
 252. A public-sector employee who imports his race-consciousness into the 
workplace should not be any more disadvantaged for doing so than the private-sector 
employee who seeks protection under Title VII from work demands that violate his 
religious tenets.  No per se approach is used in the latter cases; rather, the inquiry 
trains on reasonable accommodation.  Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 
60, 69 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 78, 78 (1977).  If the 
practice of race-consciousness is overly disruptive to the workplace, the 
Pickering/Connick framework, like its analog in the religion context, absolves the 
employer of any obligation to tolerate the employee’s behavior. 
 253. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:  “Intersectionality,” 
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 307–08 (2001) (synthesizing the doctrinal pedigree of 
intersectionality and related theories of discrimination:  “[I]ntersectionality theory 
provides a formidable challenge to the notion that scholars can adequately examine 
or provide solutions to one form of subordination without analyzing how it is 
affected and shaped by other systems of domination”).  Although intersectionality 
theory has largely focused on the confluence of multiple disadvantageous statuses in 
shaping the experience of discrimination, I have previously set forth a comparable 
theory in the context of protected speech under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision 
and race: 
Race is simply not distinguishable from conduct opposing racism where, as 
the psychological and medical evidence demonstrates, that opposition is 
both a manifestation of racism’s harm and an effort to avoid further harm.  
If this is true, then conduct that perpetuates racism cannot be treated 
differently from conduct that punishes opposition to racism. 
Smith, supra note 36, at 572. 
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an officer.254  In Pickering/Connick balancing, once employee speech is 
determined to be on a matter of public concern, the employer must 
show that the speech was disruptive or had the potential for 
disruption in order to justify disciplining the employee.  Evidence of 
personal bias on the part of the employer against the speech vitiates a 
showing of disruption and instead suggests that objections to content 
were the true reason for employer discipline. 
Similarly, Ceballos could have established that the views he voiced 
were more likely to subject him to discipline because they were 
readily associated with the views of people of color and thus more 
likely to cause his superiors to interpret those views through the 
disadvantageous prisms that people of color are commonly seen and 
heard.  In making such an allegation, Ceballos need not have 
brought an equal protection claim and suffered the disadvantages 
attendant to that doctrine.  As Burlington Northern intimates, a litigant 
should not be foreclosed from establishing the factual background of 
his speech and the responses thereto.  Indeed, liberal rules of 
pleading and discovery facilitate the full factual development and 
presentation of a claim.255  These facts may help courts to ascertain 
“the real social impact of workplace behavior.”256  In the context of 
employee free speech and Pickering/Connick balancing, these 
background facts are relevant to both the determination of whether 
the speech is on a matter of public concern—hardly a culturally 
neutral inquisition, as evidenced by Justice Scalia’s racially 
stereotyped dissent in Rankin v. McPherson257—and whether any 
putative or actual disruptiveness of the speech is primarily the result 
of its norm deviance or genuinely threatens the legitimate 
operational concerns of the employer. 
CONCLUSION 
Disclaiming any connection between Ward Churchill’s 9/11 
remarks and the allegations of research misconduct, the President of 
the University of Colorado recommended Ward Churchill’s dismissal to 
                                                          
 254. First Amended Complaint, Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. 00-11106 (C.D. Ca. filed 
Sept. 24, 2001). 
 255. See, e.g., NAN D. HUNTER, THE POWER OF PROCEDURE:  THE LITIGATION OF JONES 
V. CLINTON 63–73 (2002) (detailing a crucial stage in Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 
(E.D. Ark. 1998), in which the district court allowed Jones to assert allegations 
regarding President Clinton’s extramarital affairs “for the purpose of clarifying 
plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights claims as far as proof at trial is concerned”). 
 256. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). 
 257. See supra notes 97–110 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of a 
speaker’s race on how his speech is interpreted). 
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the university’s Board of Trustees.258  The recommendation was 
accepted, and Churchill was fired.259  Churchill’s First Amendment 
suit against the university is ongoing.260  Its outcome, and the events 
leading to it, underscore the peril for all public employee free 
speech, for if the free exchange of ideas—especially provocative 
ones—is not countenanced in the academic setting, they are surely 
endangered elsewhere. 
The most indelible lessons in the law are those that are personally 
experienced.  Reading about the litigants whose stories inform this 
Article, and conversing with Ceballos and Churchill, caused me to 
reflect deeply about how my own speech and that of millions of other 
ordinary people of color is routinely placed under a racial 
microscope.  For private sector employees, most of whom are at-will, 
the traditional regimen of antidiscrimination law does not purport to 
address the intersection of speech and status that creates a unique 
vulnerability to discrimination for the minority employee.  But the 
brooding presence of the First Amendment has not permitted the 
minority public sector employee’s speech to escape the racial lens 
either.  This Article is a small contribution in the struggle to peel 
back the lens, to permit people of color to speak unburdened by the 
inequality of their status.  To the dismay of some, and to the surprise 
of others, I have insisted on this equality for my own speech.  
Ceballos, McPherson, Jeffries, Churchill, and numerous other 
courageous litigants of color fortify my determination. 
Ward Churchill’s odyssey through the courts may well come to 
define not merely the latest juncture in an evolving First Amendment 
jurisprudence but to some degree, how free we remain as a people.  
Change cannot occur without dissent, and the right of peaceful 
dissent cannot be guarded if its parameters are drawn on the implicit 
assumption that prevailing norms should be privileged. 
                                                          
 258. The Ward Churchill Endgame, INSIDE HIGHER ED, May 29, 2007, available at 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/05/29/churchill. 
 259. Arthur Kane, CU Seeks Dismissal of Churchill Lawsuit, DENV. POST, Sept. 5, 2007, 
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